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DEDICATION 
 
 
The man in the cockpit is often the most visible component of a tremendous team working tirelessly toward 
a common goal.  In combat, the pilot’s very life depends upon the skill and dedication of the crews that 
maintain and load the aircraft.  In flight test, that team includes a cadre of highly skilled engineers and 
technicians from both industry and government, many of whom are all but invisible to the population of the 
country they protect.  This thesis is dedicated to the men and women of the Joint Standoff Weapon  
(JSOW) Integrated Test Team who developed and cleared this revolutionary weapon for its continuing use 
in combat, and to those men and women across the country who continue to serve “behind the scenes” to 
make this country strong enough to carry the torch of freedom across the globe. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
JSOW First Launch Aircrew and Ground Support Personnel, 13 December 1994
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Flight clearance for carriage and release of a weapon on board an aircraft is a complex process, and 
involves myriad tests in order to first establish a flight envelope within which separation testing may 
commence.  Though the author was also integrally involved in the air worthiness testing that immediately 
preceded AGM-154A Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) separation and launch testing on the F/A-18 Hornet, 
this thesis will focus exclusively on those latter elements.   
 
Developmental testing to establish safe separation for jettison and launch envelopes included fit checks, 
ground jettison tests, in-flight jettison tests from both outboard and inboard aircraft weapons stations and 
initial launch testing to establish the starting point for follow-on weapons systems testing.  These tests 
began in early 1994, with the first JSOW jettison flight event happening on 8 March 1994 and the first 
launch on 13 December 1994.  Though the test program is now dated, the analysis of the methodology 
successfully used in this program is as pertinent today as it was in 1994.  Test methods discussed in this 
document remain the standard for ordnance separation testing, and review of how those methods were 
applied to the Joint Standoff Weapon test program ten years ago may still provide valuable insight to any 
organization attempting to discern the safest, most cost-effective method for conducting ordnance 
separation testing in modern test programs.  The purpose of this thesis is to clearly document and assess the 
iterative flight test methodology used throughout the JSOW test program, and to also document in detail 
and draw conclusions based upon the results of the jettison and launch separation flight test program. 
 
The desired F/A-18C/D launch envelope to be cleared in this case was 0.60 to 0.95 Mach, +10 to -45 
degrees pitch angle and 200 ft AGL to 30,000 ft MSL.  Separation testing consisted of both jettison and 
launch testing.  As launch releases were predicted to exhibit better separation characteristics, the test matrix 
built up from the most benign to the most severe jettison condition, thereby clearing the launch envelope 
along the way.  Once jettison testing was completed, a demonstration of the launch release at the most 
severe jettison condition was to be conducted to verify JSOW safe separation characteristics in the launch 
mode.  Initial wind tunnel analysis predicted that at the most critical separation condition, the separating 
store would not only violate the safe release condition requirement of 6 inches clearance, but it would 
actually impact the fuel tank during separation. 
 
Test methodology was fairly straight-forward – proceed through the flight test matrix until the edge of the 
envelope, as indicated by unsatisfactory jettison characteristics, was determined, then proceed with launch 
testing with active control surfaces until unsatisfactory separation characteristics or the full desired 
envelope were attained.  In contrast, data collection, reduction and analysis techniques were extensive and 
 
 
iv
complex.  As each JSOW test point necessarily expended a valuable (and expensive) test asset, it was 
hoped that by investing in a robust separation model based initially upon wind tunnel analysis, and by 
updating that model with separation data derived from photogrammetric analysis and on-board aircraft and 
weapon telemetry data during separation, the fidelity of that separation model could be improved and 
validated adequately such that some planned separation test points could be skipped.  The data collection 
effort included photogrammetric targeting of launch aircraft and weapons, on-board high speed cameras, 
on-board aircraft and weapon telemetry of multiple parameters, and ground and chase aircraft video. 
 
A total of 15 flights expending 12 JSOW test vehicles were required to clear the jettison envelope for the 
outboard station between 8 March 1994 and 12 October 1994.  Three more flights expending three 
additional JSOW test vehicles were required to clear the inboard jettison envelope between 18 October 
1994 and 1 December 1994.  JSOW positional data derived from aircraft and weapon telemetry and 
photogrammetric analysis were successfully used to update and validate the JSOW separation mode, which 
enabled the omission of five test points.  Separation characteristics were satisfactory for each of the 15 
JSOW jettison test points.  Separation characteristics of the JSOW in the launch mode matched predictions 
and met all requirements of the specification for release, thus clearing the flight envelope for follow-on 
functional testing of the weapon in-flight. 
 
Conclusions are drawn upon the applicability and effectiveness of the flight test methodology, and upon the 
separation characteristics of the JSOW from the F/A-18 throughout the separation test program.  For the 
high profile JSOW test program, the iterative modeling and simulation used throughout separation testing 
was extremely effective at improving overall test safety and efficient use of extremely expensive test assets.  
For future test programs that may benefit from the extensive lessons learned with iterative modeling and 
simulation using multiple data sources in this test program, the author recommends consideration of 
methodology similar to that used for AGM-154A JSOW.  The author also emphatically recommends use of 
the Integrated Test Team concept for future test programs, wherever feasible.  Finally, the author makes 
specific recommendations as pertains to the jettison and launch envelopes of the AGM-154A JSOW when 
released from the F/A-18C/D aircraft. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
Development of the AGM-154A Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) ushered in a new generation of weapons 
used in strike warfare, the Global Positioning System (GPS) guided weapons.  But development of a new 
weapon is only part of the effort required in development of a functional airborne weapon system, and 
integration of that weapon onto the aircraft that will employ it in combat is a significant endeavor.  The 
U.S. Navy F/A-18C Hornet was selected as the first aircraft to integrate the AGM-154A JSOW, and by 
November of 1993, the weapon was ready for air worthiness flight testing.  After the flight envelope was 
defined through air worthiness flight testing, weapon separation testing could proceed.  The purpose of the 
JSOW separation flight test program was simply to clear the weapon for jettison and follow-on flight 
testing to eventually establish the full launch envelope required for combat employment.  Though much of 
the same data used for evaluation of suitable employment envelopes are necessarily included in this thesis, 
the primary purpose of this document is to describe how the use of a unique, iterative flight test 
methodology enabled safe, cost-effective clearance of those jettison and launch envelopes. 
 
Success of the JSOW program hinged on the extraordinary efforts of hundreds of dedicated individuals 
from industry, from the Naval Air Systems Command (who sponsored the program) and from the 
Integrated Test Team.  The author’s role in the Integrated Test Team was that of Project Officer, 
specifically responsible for co-leadership (with a Project Engineer, Mr. Mike Griffith) of the 
Developmental Testing Phase IIA portion of the overall test program, wherein the weapon system jettison 
and initial launch envelopes were established.  The author also personally piloted the flight tests for first 
jettison, all envelope end-point tests and the first JSOW launch – expending a total of six JSOW test 
vehicles in the process. 
 
Much of the material forming the basis for the beginnings of this thesis was adapted from the author’s 
original work as part of the test team that created the test plans under which the Joint Standoff Weapon was 
tested.  Specifically, sections from those test plans were used as a starting point for Test Aircraft and Test 
Weapon Descriptions, Scope and Method of Tests, though they were adjusted, combined and added to, 
where required, to fit the context of this document.  The remaining chapters of this document, including 
Chronology, Results and Discussion, Conclusions and Recommendations, and the Epilogue represent the 
efforts of the author alone.  Interpretation of photographic evidence since transferred to videotape was 
conducted and reported upon by the author, though photogrammetric and telemetry data analysis was 
conducted as indicated for each source listed.  Views and opinions discussed in this thesis are these of the 
author alone, and do not necessarily represent the official position of the United States Navy. 
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 1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
Introduction 
 
The test program and events discussed in following paragraphs occurred more than ten years ago.  Not 
surprisingly, some of the organizational names have changed since then.  Most notably, McDonnell 
Douglas Aerospace has become part of the Boeing Company, Texas Instruments has become part of the 
Raytheon Company, and the Navy Flight Test and Engineering Group has become the Test Wing Atlantic, 
while the subordinate Strike Aircraft Test Directorate became the Naval Strike Aircraft Test Squadron and 
finally Experimental Test Squadron (VX) 23.  For consistency with the period referenced, the names of 
each organization have been left unchanged.  Though the test program is now dated, the analysis of the 
methodology successfully used in this program is as pertinent today as it was in 1994.  Test methods 
discussed in this document remain the standard for ordnance separation testing, and review of how those 
methods were applied to the Joint Standoff Weapon test program ten years ago may still provide valuable 
insight to any organization attempting to discern the safest, most cost-effective method for conducting 
ordnance separation testing in modern test programs.  The purpose of this thesis is to clearly document and 
assess the iterative flight test methodology used throughout the JSOW test program, and to also document 
in detail and draw conclusions based upon the results of the jettison and launch separation flight test 
program, overall. 
 
Background Information 
 
In the early 1990s, the AGM-154A Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) was the “next generation” standoff 
weapon, and was developed by Texas Instruments (TI).  The tactical glide weapon was to be launched from 
both existing and future United States Navy (USN), United States Marine Corps (USMC) and United States 
Air Force (USAF) aircraft.  It was to provide a surface attack weapon capability against a wide spectrum of 
land and sea targets during day or night, and under all-weather conditions.  The Navy was the lead service 
for JSOW, and had selected the F/A-18C/D as the initial JSOW integration launch platform.  The 
Advanced Interdiction Weapon System (which became JSOW) System Specification, reference 1, required 
that it could be carried throughout the full subsonic aircraft envelope and supersonic dash capability on the 
F/A-18 with minimum restrictions.  The System Specification also required a launch envelope of 0.60 to 
0.95 IMN, +10 to -45degrees pitch angle (and 15 degrees roll) and release altitudes from 200 ft AGL to 
30,000 ft MSL.  The JSOW integrated test team consisted of (at the time) Navy Flight Test and 
Engineering Group (FTEG), McDonnell Douglas Aerospace (MDA) and TI personnel.  JSOW Air 
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Worthiness Testing began at Patuxent River in November 1993.  MDA completed flutter, Active 
Oscillation Control (AOC), captive loads and adjacent store ejection testing in March 1994.  The Navy 
completed F/A-18 flying quality and performance, noise and vibration and carrier suitability flight testing 
of the JSOW in July 1994.  Jettison testing of the JSOW was required in order to establish a safe separation 
envelope for the weapon, and began in March 1994 with outboard jettison of the JSOW with and without 
an adjacent fuel tank.  Testing of separation characteristics from the inboard stations was added to the 
original separation test plan in October 1994, and launch (defined as active control fins and wing 
deployment) testing began with the first launch in December 1994. 
 
Purpose of the Test Program 
 
The overall purpose of store compatibility testing aboard an aircraft is to ensure the weapon system’s 
compatibility across the spectrum of aerodynamic interface, electric interface, safe separation, carrier 
suitability, cockpit controls and displays, and the capability to be employed in its designed modes of 
operation.  Necessarily, a flight envelope must first be established prior to separation testing.  Once at least 
a preliminary flight envelope has been established, safe separation testing may commence.  In the case of 
the AGM-154A JSOW, the complex weapon system had a jettison mode in which its control fins were 
inactive and wings did not deploy.  Because the jettison mode was predicted to be the most critical mode 
for separation characteristics, separation testing proceeded in this mode until a suitable separation envelope 
could be established, whereupon launch (active control fins and wing deployment) separation testing could 
commence.  The purpose of JSOW program flight testing was to first establish and recommend a jettison 
release envelope, then establish and recommend a launch release envelope for the JSOW on F/A-18C/D 
fleet aircraft.  Specific objectives to be completed during the first launch further included: verification of 
correct operation of the JSOW in a captive environment, demonstration of safe separation of a JSOW 
launched from an F/A-18 aircraft, demonstration of safe wing deployment following JSOW launch, 
demonstration of safe controlled free-flight capability of a JSOW, collection of JSOW free-flight 
aerodynamic missile data, verification and effectiveness evaluation of the Flight Termination System 
(FTS), and demonstration of JSOW structural integrity before and after command destruct. 
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CHAPTER II 
DESCRIPTION OF TEST AIRCRAFT AND MODIFICATIONS 
 
Description of the F/A-18C/D Aircraft and Components 
 
F/A-18C/D Aircraft General Information 
 
The F/A-18C/D Hornet (figure 2) was a single (F/A-18C) or dual seat (F/A-18D), dual-engine, supersonic 
fighter attack aircraft originally built by MDA (now a wholly owned subsidiary of Boeing).  The aircraft 
was intended for the all-weather intercept, identify, destroy and ground attack missions.  Designed to be 
powered by two General Electric F404-GE-400 or F404-GE-402 turbofan engines with afterburner, flight 
test aircraft were powered by F404-GE-400 engines.  Distinguishing aircraft features included a pressurized 
cockpit enclosed by an electrically operated clam shell canopy, a variable camber mid-fuselage wing with 
fuselage mounted leading edge extensions (LEXs), and twin vertical stabilizers, which were angled 20 
degrees outboard and located well forward of the slab-type horizontal stabilators.  Flight control was 
accomplished via a four-channel dual computer flight control system, and all flight control surfaces were 
hydraulically operated.  The speed brake was mounted on the top side of the aft fuselage between the 
vertical stabilizers.  The aircraft was configured with nine external weapon stations (numbered sequentially 
from the left wingtip to the right), five of which were designed to be capable of carrying and releasing air-
to-ground ordnance.  The stations known as the outboard stations were numbered 2 and 8, while the 
inboard stations (closest to the fuselage) were numbered 3 and 7.  Stations 4, 5, and 6 were not capable of 
carrying the AGM-154A Joint Standoff Weapon.  An integrated Stores Management Set (SMS) computer 
with a MIL-STD-1553 data bus was used for armament system control.   
 
 
 
Figure 2 
The F/A-18C Hornet 
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The SMS software loads used during these tests included Operational Flight Program (OFP) 89A and 91C.  
Weapon codes for each station were entered into the Stores Management Panel (SMP), figure 3.  Since 
software integration (which required an F/A-18C) was not critical for the initial phases of flight testing, an 
earlier series F/A-18A was used for the first few flights of the separation test program.  The test aircraft, 
Bureau Numbers 161925 (F/A-18A number 87 (A87), side number 106) and 163476 (F/A-18C number 37 
(C37), side number 101) were representative of fleet aircraft for the purposes of this evaluation.  A more 
detailed description of the F/A-18 aircraft is presented in the F/A-18 NATOPS Flight Manual, reference 2. 
 
BRU-32 Ejector Rack 
 
The F/A-18 aircraft utilized the BRU-32 as its parent rack.  BRU-32 bomb ejector racks were designed to 
be used to suspend single stores, multiple bomb racks and missile launchers using either 14 or 30 inch 
suspension hooks.  Features of the bomb rack included safety interlocks and automatic sway bracing.  
Sensing switches were used to indicate to the armament computer that a store or suspension unit was 
loaded.  The primary ejector unit used two CCU-45/B cartridge actuated devices (CADs) to generate the 
required gas pressure for normal release or for select and emergency jettison of a single store or rack- 
launcher.  Independent ignition wiring went to each cartridge, and firing of any one cartridge was designed 
to sympathetically fire the other cartridge.  The auxiliary release system in the unit used on Mk 19 MOD 0 
CAD, which was designed to open the hooks only should be the select and emergency jettison modes fail.  
Two zero retention force (ZRF) solenoid electromechanical arming units were provided for “nose” and 
“tail” fuze arming of mechanically fuzed bombs.  A Mk 39 receptacle which mated with the Mk 122 switch 
assembly was provided for electrical fuzing functions.  The Aircraft Stores Interface Manual (ASIM) for 
Suspension Equipment, reference 3, provides more detailed information about the BRU-32 ejector rack.  
More information about the CCU-45/B can be found in NAVAIR publication NA 11-100-1.3, reference 4. 
 
 
Figure 3 
F/A-18 Stores Management Panel 
 
Source: Operation of the F/A-18 Avionic Subsystem for Aircraft with the 13C System Configuration Set (13C SCS), NAWCWD,  
China Lake, July 1998. 
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Aircraft Flight Test Modifications 
 
Camera Systems 
 
Standard Ordnance Separation Flight Test Cameras.  Both flight test aircraft were equipped with 
externally mounted 16 mm cameras to provide adequate release coverage.  Capable of operating at 
selectable speeds, all external cameras used throughout this test were set to 200 frames per second.  
Controls for the cameras were pushbutton type, located on the left console and instrument panel of the test 
aircraft.  Standard cameras could be mounted on the wingtip stations (1 and 9), the fuselage stations (4 and 
6) and under the tailhook on the aft belly of the aircraft (looking forward).   A wing video camera replaced 
the AIM-7 antenna on the port wing of F/A-18 C37 (side number 101) between stations 2 and 3, and 
provided a downward view of the JSOW as it separated.  The camera locations for both aircraft are 
presented in appendix A (figure A-7). 
 
Nose Camera.  The nose camera was internally mounted in place of the Automatic Direction Finding 
(ADF) antenna and flush deck plate with part of the gun system removed to provide internal space for the 
camera unit.  The camera was equipped with a 90 degree lens protected by a metal fairing.  Source Error 
Correction (SEC) calibration flights were conducted to determine the errors caused to the pitot-static 
system by the fairing, and the resultant air data corrections were incorporated into the flight tests.   
 
Pylon Camera.  A pylon camera was installed in the station 2 SUU-63 pylon and provided a downward 
view of the store during release.  The camera was installed in the pylon where the encoder-decoder was 
normally installed and the encoder-decoder was moved to the Armament Monitor and Control (AMAC) 
compartment. 
 
Photogrammetric Targets.  To enable photogrammetric analysis post-flight, each test aircraft had to be 
configured with photogrammetric targets.  These targets would form the reference against which relative 
JSOW position during separation would be derived through analysis of high speed film.  A more detailed 
discussion regarding the use of photogrammetric analysis is contained in Method of Test.  Figures A-1 and 
A-2 (located in appendix A) indicate JSOW and launch aircraft photogrammetric targeting schemes. 
 
Aircraft Electrical Systems 
 
IR COOL Switch.  Electrical integration for this test was not per the standard F/A-18 Armament System, so 
a number of changes were incorporated to provide the capability to directly control voltage and firing 
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signal to the JSOW Structural Test Vehicle (STV) under test.  A jumper was installed in the Armament 
Control Processor Set (ACPS) to enable the IR COOL switch, depicted in figure A-3, to be used to control 
28 VDC1 to the JSOW STV.  Toggling the IR COOL switch twice (from ORIDE to NORM) was required 
to put the JSOW STV-F into the simulation mode, when appropriate. 
 
Select Jettison Configuration Changes.  For normal weapon release operations, release consent signal from 
depression of the release consent button on the flight control stick would be the aircrew signal to the 
armament computer for weapon release.  For JSOW flight tests, that release consent signal was used to 
irreversibly initiate the thermal batteries within the JSOW STV, which were used to power the test 
instrumentation and telemetry kit inside the test vehicle.  As the normal release consent switch was 
therefore not available to command release, weapon release for each JSOW STV was commanded by 
actuation of the normal F/A-18 selective jettison functionality.  As indicated in figure A-3, the selective 
jettison push button is on the same side of the cockpit as the emergency jettison push button, a 
characteristic which contributes to the occasional unintentional jettison of all aircraft stores via inadvertent 
actuation of the emergency jettison push button instead of the selective jettison push button.  In order to 
avoid that expensive mistake during the JSOW test program, the emergency jettison push button was 
covered with a plastic avionics connector dust cap (connected to the emergency jettison push button by a 
rubber band) immediately before each live jettison.  So that emergency jettison was available if required for 
the remainder of the flight, that cover was removed immediately following each live jettison, and removed 
from the cockpit after each flight (to prevent the potential for introduction of uncontrolled foreign object 
damage (FOD) material into the cockpit and aircraft). 
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CHAPTER III 
DESCRIPTION OF TEST WEAPON AND MODIFICATIONS 
 
Description of the AGM-154A Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) 
 
AGM-154A JSOW General Information 
 
The baseline AGM-154A JSOW variant was the first of a series of weapons, designed to be a 
conventionally armed, air launched surface attack glide weapon providing an intermediate standoff 
capability.  The baseline JSOW variant, depicted in figure 4, was 160 inches long and weighed 1065 
pounds.  The basic weapon consisted of an aerodynamically efficient airframe with spring loaded 14 and 30 
inch suspension lugs, folding wings and six non-folding tail surfaces.  Four of the tail fins were designed to 
become active after release (for in-flight control and separation stability), while the two horizontal tail fins 
remained fixed for separation stability.  After release from the launch aircraft, the tactical JSOW was 
designed to deploy its wings and guide itself to the target by an integrated navigational system consisting of 
a ring laser gyro Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) and Global Positioning System (GPS).  JSOW on-board 
computers were designed to calculate trajectories using either a direct or pre-planned waypoint route to the 
target area, where the weapon was designed to command an airborne dispense of 145 BLU-97 Combined 
Effects Bomblet submunitions.  Details of the BLU-97 submunitions are contained in appendix C.  Future 
variants and upgrades of the JSOW were planned to include BLU-108 submunitions, a unitary warhead and 
a terminal guidance system.  Figure A-4 depicts an exploded view of the AGM-154A JSOW. 
 
 
Figure 4 
AGM-154A Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)  
 
Source: Texas Instruments, JSOW TRR F/A-18, AV-8B, A-6E, F-14 Fit Checks Meeting Minutes, 4 October 1993. 
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Control Fins 
 
The four moveable control fins were mounted to the control section at a 25 degree sweep angle and were 
locked in place at zero position for captive flight by two spring lock pins.  Release of the control fin pins 
was automatically commanded by the Guidance Electronics Unit (GEU) when the JSOW batteries came 
on-line.  Pyrotechnic devices (squibs) would detonate two gas generators to retract the locking pins.  One 
gas generator would retract the two pins holding the two upper fins and one would release the two lower 
fins.  The retracted pins would be held in place by spring clips to prevent the fins from relocking during 
flight.  After activation of the gas generators, the GEU would perform a fin dither test to verify that all four 
fins had been unlocked.  The test would command the fins to 2 degrees and then back to 0 degrees, where 
they were designed to remain until active control began after launch.  Active control of the fins was 
designed to begin 39 to 52 msec after weapon release and was designed to initially zero out the angular 
motion caused by the flow field around the F/A-18 and JSOW.  At 350 msec after release, the pitch control 
was designed to command the weapon to fly at 5.5 degrees angle of attack until just before wing 
deployment.  The GEU would not initiate explicit path control until 350 msec after release.  Control fins 
were locked in place for jettison tests, but were allowed to operate normally for the launch testing. 
 
Wings 
 
For a launch event, the wings were to be stowed and locked in the folded position until commanded to 
deploy after the JSOW was launched.  While in the stowed position, the wing deployment driver was 
pinned and the system vented via a solenoid valve to prevent inadvertent deployment due to gas generator 
failure.  Deployment of the wings was to be commanded after launch when vertical separation from the 
launch aircraft was greater than 30 feet, Mach number was less than 0.85 IMN and vertical acceleration of 
the weapon was less than 2.0 g.  The weapon was designed to determine separation distance by assuming 
the aircraft continued flying the same flight path and velocity after release, calculate the new aircraft 
position, and compare it to the displacement (determined by the IMU) of the JSOW from the release point.  
When all wing deployment criteria had been met, the GEU would close the solenoid valve on the driver 
unit to prevent venting and fire the pyrotechnic devices (squibs) to detonate the gas generator.  With the 
solenoid in the closed position, gas pressure would unseat the locking pin and drive the piston forward.  
The piston drove a single yoke assembly that was mechanically linked to both wings precluding inadvertent 
deployment of a single wing.  When the piston reached the full open position (wings fully deployed), it 
would be locked in place by a spring loaded pin.  Once open and locked, the wings could not be retracted.  
If a failure in the system prevented the piston from reaching the full open and locked position, aerodynamic 
forces would return the wings to a nearly stowed position.  The JSOW was designed to begin flight path 
hold 2.1 seconds after the wings deployed (parallel to but below the launch aircraft flight path at release) to 
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assure that the launch aircraft was safely ahead in case a pull-up was commanded when the JSOW entered 
midcourse guidance.  The axial displacement between host aircraft and the JSOW was to be greater than 
150 feet for a maximum g pull-up command to be initiated.  The detailed JSOW STV-F launch wing 
deployment timeline is provided as table B-1. 
 
Weapon Flight Test Modifications 
 
Structural Test Vehicle (STV) - C 
 
Jettison testing was conducted with inert JSOW Structural Test Vehicles designated STV-Cs.  The JSOW 
wings were to remain stowed after release, and the four moveable control fins would remain locked and 
unpowered throughout the jettison event.  An internal nickel-cadmium battery (activated on the flight line 
prior to takeoff via an external switch) was designed to power the six degree of freedom instrumentation (6-
DOF) package, strain gauges and telemetry system (TM) inside the test assets.  The test vehicle’s 
aerodynamic, mass, inertia and stiffness characteristics were representative of a fully operational vehicle, 
and each test asset was targeted to support photogrammetric analysis of each release.  A representative 
JSOW STV-C target scheme is depicted in figure A-1. 
 
Structural Test Vehicle (STV) - F 
 
The launch test was accomplished with an inert JSOW Structural Test Vehicle designated STV-F.  The 
STV-F was configured similar to the STV-C test vehicles used during the jettison program.  The test 
vehicle’s aerodynamic, mass, inertia and stiffness characteristics were representative of a fully operational 
vehicle.  The STV-F was equipped with an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), a Global Positioning System 
(GPS) receiver, deployable wings, fully operational tail fins, a Flight Termination System (FTS) and a Test 
Instrumentation Kit (TIK) for real-time transmission of data.  The STV-F instrumentation system, control 
activation system and flight termination system were to be powered by thermal batteries.  The batteries 
would be activated after the test aircraft was airborne via depression of the weapon release button.  The 
launch asset would also be targeted for photogrammetric analysis.  The STV-F was representative of an All 
Up Round JSOW for the purposes of the separation evaluation. 
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Flight Termination System (FTS) 
 
The flight termination system was a dual redundant system located just aft of the TIK assembly.  It was 
powered by two thermal batteries, which were activated by the GEU during the weapon release sequence 
with release consent.  Power could not be sent to the FTS via the three phase power from the aircraft.  Each 
battery powered one flight termination receiver, one flight termination safe and arm device and one foil 
initiator.  Two UHF antennas, one mounted on each side of the JSOW, were to provide input signals to the 
two receivers through use of a series of splitters and combiners.  Either antenna was designed to provide 
input to both receivers.  Each receiver would provide a signal to enable one of FTS safe and arm devices 
which would apply power to one explosive foil initiator and ignite the flight destruct cutting charge.  This 
cutting charge ran just under the outer skin of the JSOW along the outside edge of the bulkhead behind the 
tray that held the TIK assembly.  The two foil initiators were located on either end of the cutting charge and 
either one could ignite the cutting charge – severing the aft 42 inches of the JSOW.  An illustration of  
JSOW STV-F components depicting the FTS is provided in figure A-5.  A more detailed view of the TIK 
assembly is presented in figure A-6.  A single ground test was conducted by TI prior to flight test in order 
to verify correct operation of the FTS. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SCOPE OF TESTS 
 
Tests and Test Conditions 
 
Test and Test Conditions General Information 
 
Separation testing of the JSOW consisted of jettison and launch releases.  The jettison drops defined the 
safe release of the JSOW in the “dead-bird” mode, which means that the control fins did not activate and 
the wings did not deploy.  Launch releases activated the control fins and deployed the wings.  Active 
control of the fins was designed to begin within 52 msec after hook opening and was used initially to 
dampen the angular motion caused by the flow field around the F/A-18.  No explicit course control was 
initiated until 350 msec after release.  Launch releases should therefore have exhibited better separation 
characteristics than releases in the jettison mode.   Because launch release characteristics were predicted to 
be better than the jettison release, the test matrix was to build up from the most benign to the most severe 
jettison condition (based upon wind tunnel predictions and previous F/A-18 separation testing), clearing the 
launch envelope along the way.  Once jettison testing was complete, a demonstration of the launch release 
at the most severe jettison condition was to be conducted to verify the JSOW safe separation characteristics 
in the launch mode.  If jettison testing was terminated prior to completing the test matrix, launch testing 
was to begin at the last safe jettison test point and continue until the test matrix was completed or safety of 
flight concerns terminated the test program.  
 
Captive Carriage 
 
A full air worthiness test program was conducted for JSOW concurrently with separation testing.  In order 
to first establish a flight envelope in which separation testing could proceed, flutter, active oscillation 
control (AOC) and handling qualities testing were completed prior to the first jettison separation flight.   
Structural loads, noise and vibrations and carrier suitability flight testing was conducted in parallel  with 
ongoing separation tests.  If required, a captive carriage test matrix was to be planned and executed if the 
requirement arose. 
 
Separation Tests 
 
Test and Test Conditions - Jettison Test Flights.  Fourteen jettison flights totaling approximately 14 flight 
hours and jettisoning 14 JSOW STV-Cs from parent stations 2 and 8 were initially planned.  Three of the 
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14 test flights (and jettisons) were to be flown only if deemed necessary by the flight test team upon review 
of preceding test data.  All jettison flights were conducted at the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft 
Division (NAWCAD), Patuxent River, MD using local restricted area R4005N, the Hooper Target 
complex.  Jettison conditions and store loadings are presented in tables B-2 and B-3.  The test matrix was 
designed to test the most benign jettison condition and loading (JSOW outboard, clean inboard station) then 
progress to the most critical condition and loading (JSOW outboard, fuel tank inboard).  Previous F/A-18 
testing had shown that releasing an outboard store next to an inboard fuel tank was the most critical 
separation loading (Holmes, 1993).  Data gathered during F/A-18 wind tunnel testing showed that the 
presence of the fuel tank on the inboard station induced a large outboard yawing moment to the JSOW on 
the outboard station, which caused the tail of the JSOW to approach the aft end of the fuel tank.  Selected 
JSOW trajectory predictions generated by MDA for the jettison mode are depicted as figures in appendix E.  
These predictions were considered “conservative” and were to be updated as 6-DOF and photogrammetric 
data was gathered during flight tests and included in the F/A-18 and JSOW 6-DOF model.  Kinematic 
splash patterns for the JSOW released in the jettison mode were predicted for each test, verified on each 
flight and updated as required.  Jettison altitude was to be adjusted as required to contain the splash points. 
 
Test and Test Conditions - Launch Test Flights.  Flight tests included two captive flights in the launch-
flight weapon loading configuration, and one launch flight releasing a single JSOW STV-F.  All flights 
were conducted in the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCWD), China Lake, CA test 
ranges.  The three flights in support of the first launch test included 4.0 flight hours.  Captive carriage flight 
one, designated CF-01, completed the following objectives: (1) verification of correct operation of the 
missile in a captive environment; (2) verification of the correct operation and transmission of the STV-F 
and aircraft telemetry systems with ground support; and (3) conduct practice runs of the launch profile.  
Captive carriage flight two (CF-02) was to be flown if adjustments to the JSOW software or 
instrumentation were required based upon the data collected during CF-01.  Captive carriage flight three, 
designated DR-01 (DR – Dress Rehearsal), was conducted primarily to practice for the actual launch with 
special emphasis on the launch profile.  One launch flight was conducted wherein a single JSOW STV-F 
was launched from the aircraft station 2 parent rack.  The launch test was constructed with the objectives of 
verifying operation of the JSOW control system and Flight Termination System (FTS) and demonstrating 
that a controlled separation was more benign than a jettison in similar conditions.  Subsequent launches 
were to be conducted to evaluate release characteristics at the end points defined by the jettison program, 
but were not a part of the test program covered by this report (those tests were categorized under 
Developmental Testing Phase IIB, or DT-IIB).  JSOW STV-F launch conditions are presented in table 1. 
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Table 1 
JSOW STV-F Launch Conditions 
Parameter Jettison 
Airspeed (KCAS / IMN) 575 / 0.95 
Altitude (ft MSL / AGL) 5,000 / 2,600 
Flight Path Angle (deg) Level 
Normal Acceleration (g) +0.7 to +1.0 
 
 
Table 2 
JSOW Launch and Jettison Flight Test Envelope 
Parameter Carriage Jettison 
Airspeed (KCAS / IMN) 635 / 1.3 575 / 0.95 
Altitude (ft MSL) LBA 4,000 to 6,000 
Normal Acceleration (g) -2.0 to +6.0 +0.7 to +1.0 
 
 
Test Envelope 
 
All test flights and test parameters were conducted within the limits of the F/A-18 NATOPS Flight Manual, 
reference 2, and as outlined in the NAVAIRSYSCOM flight clearances.  Specific limitations for carriage 
and release events are presented as table 2. 
 
Flight Clearance 
 
Flight clearances obtained from NAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-530) authorizing FTEG to conduct weapon 
jettison and launch testing are listed as references 5, 6 and 7.  As part of the JSOW test team, the AIR-5301 
JSOW representative was included in the decision making process when progressing through the test 
matrix and when changes were made to the test matrix.  Final concurrence from the AIR-5301 
representative for each test point was obtained at the JSOW test flight readiness review conference and 
review prior to each test flight.  The JSOW test flight readiness review conference and subsequent test 
flight reviews consisted of appropriate personnel from SA80, NAVAIR, TI and MDA.  NATOPS and 
TACMAN limits were observed for all areas not specifically covered by the flight clearance. 
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Test Loading 
 
Test loading was a normal single-seat aircraft, including full internal fuel at start.  Individual flight test 
loadings are shown in table B-2.  Values for aircraft gross weight and center of gravity (CG) position were 
calculated by test squadron personnel prior to each test flight. 
 
Test Configuration 
 
All tests were conducted with flaps in AUTO, landing gear UP, speedbrake IN and thrust as required to 
reach test point conditions. 
 
Test Standards 
 
Jettison Test Flight Standards 
 
Jettison tests were evaluated in accordance with MIL-STD-1763A, Guide to Aircraft/Stores Certification 
Procedures, reference 8.  The test points were considered valid if the tolerances in table 3 were met.  Flight 
tests not meeting these tolerances were to be repeated at the discretion of the separation test team.  Aircraft 
Head’s Up Display (HUD) tape, onboard records and telemetry data were used to monitor release 
parameters.  The pilot also recorded level release data on kneeboard cards.  Targeted flight parameters were 
adjusted as required to correct for the effects of the nose camera on the pitot-static system. 
 
Table 3 
JSOW Jettison Test Point Tolerances 
Parameter Tolerance 
Airspeed (KCAS) ± 10 
Mach (IMN) ±  0.01 
Altitude (ft) ±  500 ft (level jettison) + 1000 / -500 ft (dive jettison) 
Flight Path Angle (deg) ± 3 
Normal Acceleration (g) ±  0.1 
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Launch Test Flight Standards 
 
As the launch test incorporated multiple objectives, there were different test standards for each objective.  
Launch separation tests were also evaluated in accordance with MIL-STD-1763A, reference 8.  The 
primary safe separation objective was to obtain data for the comparison of launch separation characteristics 
with known separation characteristics, determined via previous testing at airspeed intervals sufficient 
enough to enable comparison of launch data from any airspeed within the jettison envelope.  Accordingly, 
the tolerances required to meet this test objective were relaxed.  The launch test point was to be considered 
valid if the tolerances in table 4 were met.  Test objectives which pertained to the free flight and 
performance of the missile varied according to flight phase, and are presented in table 5 as well as in the 
STV-F launch detailed timeline, figure D-1.  Flight tests not meeting these tolerances were to be repeated at 
the discretion of the separation test team.  Aircraft HUD tape, onboard records and telemetry data were 
used to monitor release parameters.  The pilot recorded level release data on kneeboard cards.  Targeted 
flight parameters were adjusted to correct for the effects of the nose camera on the pitot-static system. 
 
Table 4 
JSOW Launch Test Point Tolerances 
Parameter Tolerance 
Airspeed (KCAS) ± 25 
Mach (IMN) ±  0.02 
Altitude (ft) ±  500 ft 
Flight Path Angle (deg) ± 3 
Normal Acceleration (g) ±  0.2 
 
Table 5 
JSOW Free Flight Test Tolerances 
Flight Phase Parameter JSOW Power ON Self-Leveling Release Consent JSOW Launch 
Latitude (NM) ±  1.0 n/a ±  0.5 ±  0.5 
Longitude (NM) ±  1.0 n/a ±  0.5 ±  0.5 
Altitude (ft MSL) n/a n/a ±  250 ±  250 
Groundspeed n/a ±  10 knots ±  50 knots ±  50 knots 
Airspeed (KCAS) n/a ±  10 n/a n/a 
Airspeed (KTAS) n/a n/a ±  10 ±  10 
Pitch Angle (deg) n/a ±  5 of trim ±  5 of trim ±  5 of trim 
Roll Angle (deg) n/a ±  5 of zero ±  5 of zero ±  5 of zero 
Ground Track n/a n/a ±  4 deg ±  4 deg 
Crab Angle (deg) n/a n/a ≤ 5 ≤ 5 
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CHAPTER V 
METHOD OF TESTS 
 
Test Method and Procedures 
 
Test Method and Procedures General Information 
 
All test procedures were conducted in accordance with the NATCINST 8600.1A, Standardized Armament 
Test Manual, reference 9.  All test points were conducted under Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) 
within the limits of the flight clearances (references 5, 6 and 7), NATOPS Flight manual (reference 2) and 
F/A-18 Tactical Manual, Volume IV (reference 10).  Film of flight tests was reviewed by project engineers 
prior to subsequent flight testing in order to identify adverse trends in jettison characteristics and determine 
whether photogrammetric analysis or photogrammetric analysis with updates to the F/A-18 and JSOW six 
degree of freedom (6-DOF) model was required.  TI held a test flight readiness review conference prior to 
the start of the test program, and additional test flight reviews for each subsequent test flight. 
 
Modeling and Simulation 
 
Substantial investment in modeling and simulation was made throughout the JSOW program.  Before 
separation testing ever began, wind tunnel analysis and simulation was used to generate 6-DOF separation 
models for both Texas Instruments (TI) and McDonnell Douglas Aerospace (MDA).  As flight testing 
progressed, multiple data sources were used to compute actual JSOW position information relative to the 
launch aircraft, and that position data was compared to predicted values in order to refine the 6-DOF 
separation model.  Both TI and MDA performed separation analysis and separation model updates 
independently, in order to increase fidelity of the overall prediction.  Only MDA performed analysis of 
photogrammetric data when required, though that additional high-fidelity positional information was 
provided to both companies.  This iterative process was expensive and time consuming, but the decision 
was made to use this methodology in order to first decrease the risk of unanticipated unsatisfactory 
separation characteristics (weapon to aircraft impact), then to provide the potential to regain test program 
savings by making more aggressive steps in separation flight testing (reducing the total expenditure and 
analysis of very expensive flight test assets).  As photogrammetric analysis took up to 30 days to complete 
for each separation, that method was used only for the most critical separation cases.  Representative 
diagrams of TI and MDA separation predictions and analysis used throughout the JSOW separation flight 
test program are presented in figures E-1 through E-13. 
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Photogrammetry 
 
Photogrammetry is a technique of measuring positional data from photographic media.  Simply put, with 
the location of specific points (photogrammetric targets) and the relative location of applicable cameras 
known,  position information can be determined by analysis of distances between those specific points, in 
comparison.  Only one camera is required for analysis in two dimensions, but at least two cameras are 
required for analysis in three dimensions.  The photographic media used for JSOW flight testing 
photogrammetry were the on-board high-speed cameras, located on numerous weapon stations as well as 
internal to the launch station pylon itself (downward looking).  As the critical data in question were JSOW 
positions relative to aircraft and aircraft components (pylon, external fuel tank, etc.), both the weapon and 
aircraft had to be configured with photogrammetric targets.  Five types of photogrammetric targets were 
used for these tests, including circular outside with circle inside, bow tie, hour-glass, triangular and circle 
outside with bow tie inside.  Precise photogrammetric target placement data (location and orientation) were 
recorded for each JSOW test vehicle in the targeting process.  Both launch aircraft, suspension equipment 
and external fuel tanks were precisely targeted prior to testing.  Figures A-1 and A-2 indicate JSOW and 
launch aircraft photogrammetric targeting schemes. 
 
Test Method and Procedures for Jettison Tests 
 
Jettison of inert JSOW STV-Cs in the jettison mode were conducted in R4005N at the Hooper Target 
complex under positive control of Chesapeake Test Range (CTR) and in accordance with the guidelines of 
NATCINST 3710.21 Safety and Test Operations Manual Chesapeake Test Range, reference 11.  The 
jettison test matrix is presented in table B-3.  A diving entry to wings level could be used, as required, to 
achieve the desired release airspeed for straight and level data points.  Successful completion of JSOW 
ground instrumentation test was conducted prior to first flight.  Normal F/A-18 selective jettison 
procedures, contained in the F/A-18 NATOPS manual, reference 2, were used  with exception of a cap 
placed over the emergency jettison button, figure A-3, in-flight during pre-release checks and removed 
after jettison event to preclude inadvertent actuation. 
 
Test Method and Procedures for Launch Tests 
 
Electrical Integration 
 
The STV-F was entered into the Stores Management Panel (SMP) as a tactical Harpoon, code 62, and 
appeared on the aircraft stores page as “HPC” (figure 5).  Aircraft active oscillation control was not enabled 
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Figure 5 
Harpoon Selected (Boxed) On Cockpit Digital Display Indicator (DDI) 
 
Source: Operation of the F/A-18 Avionic Subsystem for Aircraft with the 13C System Configuration Set (13C SCS), NAWCWD,  
China Lake, July 1998. 
 
by the Harpoon store code, and was not required for the JSOW.  Electrical integration made use of the 
Harpoon Line of Sight (LOS) mode and display symbology.  Removal of the A-14 card from the pylon 
encoder-decoder was required for this test in order to force the aircraft armament computers into the LOS 
mode.  Launch release of the STV-F required the LOS mode so that the necessary voltages could be 
provided to the JSOW, and so that the Release Consent (RC) signal could be used to initiate the internal 
batteries.  Upon application of the RC signal, the aircraft required a response from the Harpoon that the 
STV-F could not supply, and so the aircraft would “fail” the store and remove all applied power.  The STV-
F’s batteries were designed to achieve output within 1.6 seconds of RC, whereas the aircraft mission 
computers would take 4 seconds to fail the store.  The station jettison capability for the STV-F station 
would not be inhibited regardless of A-14 card status, and was used to release the store following telemetry 
verification that the store power change over had occurred.  A locally manufactured subset of the MIL-
STD-1760 cable was used to electrically interface the aircraft and the STV-F.  
 
Test Method and Procedures  - Captive Flight Tests (CF-01, CF-02 and DR-01) 
 
 Captive flights (CF-01 and CF-02) were conducted in order to evaluate and verify that JSOW and China 
Lake Range systems were fully operational prior to committing to launch a valuable JSOW STV-F test 
asset.  The maneuvers included commanding the loaded STV-F to a “Simulated Launch” (Sim Launch) 
condition, and multiple practice runs of the launch profile.  During the Sim Launch phase of the captive 
flights, the pilot commanded the store into the simulated launch mode by repetitive selection of the IR 
COOL switch at the simulated launch point, then simulated the free flight profile of the weapon by 
manually flying a specific altitude and airspeed profile.  Test engineers at China Lake monitored control 
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inputs from the JSOW GEU to verify correct response of control software during maneuvers.  The STV-F 
used aircraft three-phase and #1 28 VDC power for the Sim Launch mode, but at no time initiated any of its 
thermal batteries.  Consequently, it was impossible for the control fins or wings to actuate or deploy while 
in this mode and still on the aircraft.  At completion of each profile, the pilot secured power to the store, 
and the maneuver could have been repeated.  The Sim Launch test was designed specifically to verify that 
the weapon Guidance and Control software was functioning as designed, and could have been repeated in 
additional flights if required to adjust and re-evaluate the missile.  The dress rehearsal flight (DR-01) also 
included Sim Launch profiles.  It was conducted primarily to practice for the actual launch, but also to 
verify via telemetry signals that the FTS was operating as designed. 
 
Test Method and Procedures  -  Launch (FF-01) 
 
Launch of an inert JSOW STV-F was conducted in the China Lake G-range complex under positive control 
of Pacific Ranges and Facilities, Land Range personnel and in accordance with the guidelines of the Naval 
Weapons Center Range Safety Manual, reference 12.  The detailed launch timeline and procedures are 
depicted in figure D-1.  The launch aircraft flew a very rigid profile while directly controlling voltages to 
the weapon through systematic actuation of specific switches in sequence.  The aircraft autopilot and 
automatic throttle controller was used to the maximum extent possible during this test, limited only by 
turbulence in the launch area.  A release consent (RC) signal was sent to the weapon to activate its thermal 
batteries, thereby committing the missile to release within 60 seconds on that run.  Launch was 
accomplished via normal F/A-18 selective jettison procedures, with exception of a cap placed over the 
emergency jettison button in-flight during pre-release checks and removed after jettison event to preclude 
inadvertent actuation (as with jettison tests).  Failure to release the weapon on that run after initiation of the 
thermal batteries would abort the test, and the aircraft would have had to return to base.  Following 
successful launch of the missile, the launch aircraft cleared to the right by rolling right and pulling, an 
automatic lead change occurred, and the chase aircraft continued to follow the weapon while the launch 
aircraft crossed to the other side of the chase and loosely followed the formation.  The test run was 
complete following activation of the missile FTS. 
 
Instrumentation and Data Requirements 
 
As previously noted, both flight test aircraft were equipped with externally-mounted 16 mm cameras to 
provide adequate release coverage; however, F/A-18 A87 (side number 106) was not configured with a 
nose camera.  Consequently, flights using A87 were restricted to those jettison test points listed in table B-3 
for which a fuel tank was not loaded on the inboard station and sufficient camera coverage could be 
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obtained without a nose camera.  All test points with a fuel tank loaded on the inboard station and the 
launch test used F/A-18 C37 (side number 101), which had an internally mounted nose camera.  For some 
of the jettison flights and the launch flight, a pylon camera was also installed in the station 2 SUU-63 
pylon, and it provided a downward view of the store during release.  Cameras operated at 200 frames per 
second for all release flights.  In addition to externally mounted cameras, ground tracking cine-theodolites 
and photo chase supplied qualitative data during jettison and launch flights.  Additional video coverage was 
provided using a trideck Super-8 recording system (aircraft C37) which could record HUD, over the 
shoulder and wing camera video all at the same time.  F/A-18 A87 was equipped with a Nose 
Instrumentation Pallet System and MDA Instrument Data System, capable of transmitting flight parameters 
as well as recording them on-board.  F/A-18 C37 was equipped with a Super Quick Installation Data 
System (SQIDS) that included an internally mounted X-band beacon for position tracking.  The SQIDS 
was a continuous recording system capable of selecting up to 2,000 sixteen bit words from the MIL-STD-
1553 bus or recording the individual busses in their entirety (MUX-All).  MUX-All data was programmed 
for separation and launch flights using F/A-18 C37.  The digital signals were encoded and inserted into a 
fixed format Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) word stream.  Data was recorded by onboard recorders and 
transmitted to a ground station via telemetry from both the weapon and the aircraft.  The data cards for each 
flight were annotated with the required test conditions and requirements for switch actuation.  The F/A-18 
aircraft onboard HUD video tape recorder was reviewed to determine actual release conditions, although 
the “event marker” was not present at release (not available for jettison events).  For level release, pilots 
also attempted to record release parameters on kneeboard cards.  Critical parameters for these flights were: 
normal acceleration, altitude, calibrated airspeed, flight path angle and IMN. 
 
Chase Aircraft 
 
Chase Aircraft for Jettison Flights 
 
A photo-chase aircraft was used when available, but was only required for the first jettison test and all 
flights releasing JSOW next to a fuel tank.  During the jettison event, the chase aircraft was positioned to 
allow optimum coverage of weapon separation characteristics, but in no case closer than 200 feet from the 
separation aircraft, or within a 60 degree cone of the separation aircraft’s longitudinal axis. 
 
Chase Aircraft for Launch Flights  
 
A photo-chase aircraft was used for the launch flight and one of the captive flights (CF-02), in order to 
familiarize the pilot with the planned weapon free-flight profile.  The chase aircraft was positioned to allow 
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optimum photo-coverage of weapon separation characteristics, but in no case closer than 200 ft laterally 
from the separation aircraft or within 60 degrees of the JSOW’s tail.  As the JSOW STV-F was equipped 
with an FTS, particular caution had to be used by the chase pilot (the chase aircraft was to remain level or 
slightly stepped up on the missile) throughout the JSOW time of flight.  If the JSOW began to deviate from 
its programmed flight, the chase pilot would have been notified to increase separation prior to activation of 
the FTS.   
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CHAPTER VI 
CHRONOLOGY 
 
Clearance of the Flight Envelope 
 
Air Worthiness Testing (AWT) included the following test programs: flutter; active oscillation control 
(AOC); handling qualities; loads; adjacent store eject (effects on JSOW when adjacent store is released); 
noise and vibrations; and carrier suitability.  The purpose of flutter testing was to substantiate that the 
aircraft with stores was free of any aeroelastic instability and had satisfactory damping characteristics 
within the prescribed flight envelope.  A total of 12 flights for 13.8 hours were conducted in a single 
configuration (wingtip missiles off) from 19 November 1993 through 9 December 1993.  An undesirable 
flight characteristic was observed at one the flutter test point conditions, resulting in a flight envelope 
restriction for that configuration.  To provide data in determining the requirement for and effectiveness of 
the F/A-18 Active Oscillation Controller when carrying the JSOW within the prescribed envelope, a total 
of 6 flights for 6.8 hours were conducted in a single configuration (wingtip missiles on) from 17 December 
1993 through 22 December 1993.  It was determined that AOC flight control mode was not required. 
 
In order to evaluate the influence of the stores and suspension equipment on the handling qualities of the 
aircraft, a total of 7 flights for 13.3 hours were conducted in two configurations from 11 January 1994 
through 1 February 1994.  There were no flight restrictions as a result of handling qualities tests.  In-flight 
loads testing was conducted in order to obtain in-flight measured data for use in verifying the structural 
integrity of the store and aircraft-store combinations.  A total of 10 flights for 9.6 hours were conducted in 
two configurations from 16 February 1994 through 1 March 1994, resulting in no flight restrictions.  
Adjacent store eject testing was conducted to measure the dynamic response of the JSOW when mounted 
on the F/A-18 during adjacent store ejection and determine the store and store interface environment and 
loads.  A total of 8 flights for 6.5 hours were conducted in two configurations from 24  March 1994 through 
8 April 1994, resulting in no flight restrictions. 
 
Noise and vibrations testing was conducted to measure and define the vibration and acoustic environment 
of the JSOW throughout the F/A-18 air-to-ground envelope, and to determine if the aircraft, store and 
suspension equipment could withstand the actual flight environment to validate the design specification 
levels.  A total of 14 flights for 13.8 hours were conducted in two configurations from 28 April 1994 
through 17 May 1994.  Carrier suitability testing was conducted to test the store under the dynamic 
conditions of actual catapult and arrested landings.  No restrictions resulted from 13 flights for 31.1 hours 
in three configurations from 14 June 1994 through July 1994. 
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Fit Tests 
 
Preliminary aircraft and stores interface (fit) tests were performed 25 August 1992 through 3 September 
1992 to support the final design of the Joint Standoff Weapon.  Fit testing of the weapon configuration that 
would be used to support air worthiness testing was conducted on the F/A-18 at the Naval Air Warfare 
Center Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, MD on 5 October 1993.  There were no conflicts or minimum 
clearance violations for the weapon loads required by the JSOW Specification Guide.  It was determined 
that the JSOW met the clearance requirements of MIL-STD-1289A as well as MIL-STD-1289B, reference 
13, for the loads specified, and was suitable for flight testing on the F/A-18 aircraft. 
 
Ground (Pit) Jettison 
 
Ground ejection tests were conducted to determine end stroke velocity, evaluate separation trajectory and 
attitude rates, verify camera field of view, demonstrate the folding lug design, verify the STV-C Test 
Instrumentation Kit (TIK) operation during the ejection event, and to collect data to evaluate structural 
response to the ejection event.  Ground ejection tests were completed in January 1994. 
 
Jettison STV-C 
 
The F/A-18 JSOW Flight Test Event Matrix is presented as table B-3.  Outboard station jettison testing 
were the first separation tests completed for JSOW, starting with the first jettison on 8 March 1994 at a 
target airspeed of 400 KCAS.  Photogrammetric analysis was time consuming (approximately a month long 
effort for each event), so the next jettison test event did not occur until 7 April 1994.  In order to optimize 
the overall schedule, separation testing on the outboard station with an adjacent inboard external fuel tank 
commenced prior to reaching the end point test with the outboard station (clean inboard), which occurred 
on 23 May 1994.  As the worst case separation involved JSOW jettison adjacent to the inboard fuel tank, 
photogrammetric analysis was required for each of the test points building up to the end point test for level 
flight, which took place on 1 September 1994.  With the 575 KCAS level point established, the final end 
point test for 575 KCAS and 45 degree dive occurred on 12 October 1994.  
 
Inboard station testing was added to the flight test matrix via test plan amendment in October 1994, and 
flight tests for that station commenced on 18 October 1994.  Capitalizing on a well-validated and 
correlating separation model, inboard station testing proceed rapidly – skipping three test points in total and 
completing testing at 575 KCAS on 1 December 1994. 
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Launch STV-F 
 
The schedule for the first JSOW launch was accelerated late in 1994 by the Conventional Weapons 
Program Manager (PMA-201).  A combination of Developmental Test (DT) Phase IIA testing and DT-IIB 
testing, the first launch combined test objectives from offices at both Patuxent River, MD and China Lake, 
CA.  Since the test required the instrumented and photographic capabilities of the aircraft that had been 
used in all other separation testing, that F/A-18 (C37, bureau number 163476) was flown to China Lake, 
CA on 5 December 1994.  After a local area familiarization flight using another aircraft, JSOW captive 
flight tests CF-01 and CF-02 were flown on 6 and 8 December 1994.  First free-flight launch test (FF-01) 
occurred on 13 December 1994. 
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CHAPTER VII 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Results and Discussion - Introduction 
 
Results and Discussion General Information 
 
Often in store separation testing, on-board high-speed cameras, ground-based and chase aircraft video 
recording are the only data sources available.  These data may resolve into essentially a binary decision – 
the store continued moving away from the aircraft, or not; or the store impacted the aircraft during release, 
or not.  If the separation test vehicles are inexpensive and available, if the separation store is similar to 
previously cleared stores, or if the total release envelope desired is conservative relative to the anticipated 
store separation characteristics, then this approach with respect to data sources may be acceptable.  In the 
case of the Joint Standoff Weapon, however, this was not the case.  The separation test vehicles were 
expensive and manufactured specifically for each test.  The separation store was completely unique as 
compared to existing cleared weapons.  And the desired flight envelope relative to the anticipated 
separation characteristics was aggressive – in fact, the separating store was initially predicted to impact the 
aircraft at the test end point.  Consequently, it was appropriate to invest heavily in modeling and simulation 
in support of the JSOW test program, include multiple parameter telemetry data systems on-board both the 
aircraft and the separation test vehicles, and target both aircraft and store for photogrammetric post-flight 
analysis.  At the end of separation testing, however, the data eventually resolve into a binary decision – the 
separation characteristics at end-point test conditions were either satisfactory, or not.  Therefore, the effort 
expended on data collection, analysis, modeling and simulation becomes an effort to safely reach end-point 
test conditions.  The following paragraphs in this section articulate that effort, in detail. 
 
Summary of Data Sources 
 
Multiple data sources were integrated to provide the best possible prediction for the next test.  The pilot and 
flight test engineer post-test “daily” flight reports were used to capture information pertaining to aircraft 
configuration, flight test conditions, preliminary test point data, weather, etc.  Photographic data consisted 
of ground-based video of the aircraft and post-release weapon to impact, on-board high-speed cameras and 
video as noted in figure A-7, and photo-chase aircraft still photographs and video.  Review of photographic 
data provided a cross-check for flight parameter data streams (direction of roll rate, for instance), overall 
separation characteristics and a general understanding of store separation characteristics that is much more 
difficult to acquire from tabular numbers of position data.  Photographic data were the best source for 
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determining whether or not the separating store was close to violating minimum separation criteria, but 
more detailed analysis had to be conducted when that review of photographic data showed a critical 
condition or trend.  Reconstruction of JSOW position data based upon six degree of freedom (6-DOF) 
telemetry signals and aircraft parameters was conducted after each flight to corroborate photographic data, 
provide quantification of how close the store was to violating separation clearance minimums, and improve 
fidelity of the separation models.  As photogrammetric analysis was more expensive and time consuming, it 
was used sparingly to support the most critical separation test points.  Photogrammetric analysis provided 
an independent source of JSOW position data, and was generally considered the most accurate analysis of 
all data sources. 
 
Predictive Analysis 
 
To expand upon the use of modeling and simulation discussion earlier in this document, both Texas 
Instruments and McDonnell Douglas Aerospace created separation models based initially upon wind tunnel 
analysis.  In addition to the obvious objective of the weapon separating safely during each separation flight 
test, another objective was the continuous update to the fidelity of each separation model based upon 
position data gained both from 6-DOF sensor data broadcast and recorded by both aircraft and weapon.  
Photogrammetric analysis was also used when deemed necessary based upon criticality of the dependent 
flight test point versus the delay incurred within the total flight test program.  The most current, updated 
analysis and predictions for the next separation test points were presented at test readiness reviews 
scheduled between critical test flights.  Selected representative MDA wind tunnel analysis-based 
predictions for JSOW separation are presented as figures E-1 through E-8.  TI separation predictions are 
presented as figure E-9 and E-13, and are inclusive of data gained from all jettison tests up to those points. 
 
Results and Discussion - Jettison 
 
JSOW STV-C Outboard Jettison in Sequence with Analysis 
 
Separation flight testing of the AGM-154A JSOW began with testing of jettison from the outboard station, 
without the presence of an inboard station external fuel tank, which was the most critical adjacent store for 
separation.  Tests were initially planned for 14 events, sequentially progressing from lower airspeed and no 
external fuel tank, level flight conditions to 575 KCAS and adjacent external fuel tank, 45 degree dive 
conditions.  In the course of flight testing and data analysis, it was determined that jettison events number 7 
and 9 (425 and 475 KCAS, respectively) could be safely skipped.  For the remainder of the jettison test 
events from the outboard station, those tests were conducted with the gear UP and flaps AUTO, and in the 
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test loadings indicated in table B-2, loadings 1 and 2.  Flight test aircraft, date of test, aircrew and jettison 
test point parameters are as listed in table B-3.  Myriad predictions and post-flight analyses were available 
before and after each flight test.  Only selected representative samples of those products are presented 
within this document.  Analysis of applicable flight test data sources for each jettison test are presented in 
the following paragraphs.  As post-flight analysis from each test necessarily included the recommendation 
to proceed to the next test point in sequence (or skip a test point enroute), that recommendation is assumed 
in following paragraphs unless otherwise indicated.  All tests met the separation characteristics 
requirements of the Specification, reference 8, unless otherwise indicated.  Except where noted to the 
contrary, test point parameters were achieved within established tolerances. 
 
Jettison Event 1.  This test event was the first release of a Joint Standoff Weapon from the F/A-18.  
Conducted at 401 KCAS, separation for this was predicted to be benign, with only slight nose down pitch 
attitude and very little roll or yaw predicted as the store fell away from the aircraft (depicted in table E-1 
and figure E-1).  Six degree of freedom separation data for the first second after jettison is presented as 
table E-2.  Review of photo and video sources indicate that the JSOW STV-C separated cleanly from the 
host aircraft, pitched slightly nose down and translated slightly outboard after jettison.  Post-flight data 
analysis indicated a need to update the BRU-32 Bomb Rack ejector force model, the ejector friction and the 
JSOW mechanical bending model in the 6-DOF (TI) and SDF (MDA) models (TI, 31 March 1994), but 
flight test results otherwise compared favorably with both TI and MDA predicted values.  An unexpected 
lug bounce was obvious in the high-speed film, and this issue was resolved over the course of the flight test 
program – it did not affect separation characteristics.  JSOW separation for jettison event 1 is depicted in 
figures A-8 through A-10. 
 
Jettison Event 2.  The second JSOW jettison event was conducted at 445 KCAS.  Review of photo and 
video sources indicate that the JSOW STV-C separated cleanly from the host aircraft, pitched down and 
moved slightly outboard after jettison.  Slight outboard yaw was noted from the pylon camera, but it was 
quickly damped.  Flight test results compared favorably with both TI and MDA predicted values. 
 
Jettison Event 3.  JSOW jettison event three was conducted at 497 KCAS.  The store once again separated 
cleanly from the host aircraft, but left roll and outboard (left) yaw rates appeared more significant for this 
release as the store fell away below the aircraft.  Six degree of freedom separation data for the first second 
after jettison is presented as table E-3.  Otherwise unremarkable, flight test results compared favorably with 
both TI and MDA predicted values. 
 
Jettison Event 4.  The first attempt to jettison at 550 KCAS resulted in a hung store, due to a maintenance 
malfunction with the BRU-32 rack.  Jettison was not attempted and that mission was aborted.  The second 
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attempt at jettison was successful at 550 KCAS.  The STV-C separated cleanly, pitched nose down and 
maintained positive movement away from the aircraft.  A slight outboard yaw was also observed.  Flight 
test results compared favorably with both TI and MDA predicted values. 
 
Jettison Event 5.  This event was the final jettison from the outboard station with no adjacent store on the 
inboard station.  It was conducted at 578 KCAS, and again, the JSOW STV-C separated cleanly, pitched 
nose down and maintained positive movement away from the aircraft.  Left yaw developed steadily to less 
than 10 deg total yaw during the first 10 ft of fall, but the separation overall was smooth and predictable.  
Roll rate after jettison was slight and left.  Pylon film indicated the roll direction reverse during the fall to 
impact.  Vertical acceleration recorded real-time from the JSOW STV-C Test Instrumentation Kit (TIK) 
was approximately 6.9 g  (2 g lower than previous jettisons), most likely attributable to a defective 
cartridge actuating device (CAD).  Initial predicted separation characteristics for this event, shown in figure 
E-2, were much more dramatic in yaw than noted during the flight test. 
 
Jettison Event 6.  Jettison event 6 was the first in the presence of an inboard station external fuel tank.  
Conducted at 399 KCAS, separation for this was predicted to be characterized by a notable left yaw 
generated as the store fell away from the aircraft, as depicted in E-3.  Six degree of freedom separation data 
for the first second after jettison are presented as table E-4, and indicate a peak outboard yaw of 16.04 deg 
occurring at 0.60 sec after jettison.  Review of photo and video sources indicate that the JSOW STV-C 
separated cleanly from the host aircraft, pitched slightly nose down, yawed slightly left and translated 
outboard after jettison.  Initial MDA predicted minimum miss distance (MMD) for this event was 22.41 
inches (table E-1), revised before flight to 23.0 inches by TI, and to 22.8 inches by  MDA.  Actual MMD 
for this jettison was computed post-flight to be 23.0 inches (TI) and 21.2 inches (MDA).  Flight test results 
compared favorably overall with both TI and MDA revised values. 
 
Jettison Event 8.  Due to fidelity of TI and MDA predictive models and confidence of the test team that 
separation characteristics were adequately estimated by those models, the 425 KCAS jettison event 7 was 
skipped.  Jettison event 8 was conducted at 450 KCAS.  It was anticipated that the magnitude of the 
outboard yaw generated by proximity to the inboard external fuel tank would be increased, thereby 
decreasing the MMR predicted for this event.  Nonetheless, separation was predicted to be safe for the test 
conditions.  Review of photo and video sources indicate that the JSOW STV-C separated cleanly from the 
host aircraft, pitched slightly nose down, yawed significantly left and translated rapidly outboard after 
jettison.  From the keel camera, the tail of the store appeared to track diagonally down and inboard as the 
nose tracked outboard and significantly nose down, generating a nose down, left yaw separation.  Six 
degree of freedom separation data for the first second after jettison is presented as table E-5, and indicates a 
peak outboard yaw of 25.04 deg occurring at 0.60 sec after jettison.  Also noted in table E-5, roll angle was 
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much more oscillatory for this jettison.  Initial MDA predicted MMD for this event was 19.60 inches (table 
E-1), revised before flight to 20.0 inches by TI, and to 21.0 inches by  MDA.  Actual MMD for this jettison 
was computed post-flight to be 18.5 inches by both TI and MDA.  Flight test results compared favorably 
overall with both TI and MDA revised values. 
 
Jettison Event 10.  Retaining the same confidence in predictability that enable skipping of jettison event 7, 
the 475 KCAS jettison event 9 was skipped and  jettison event 10 was targeted for 500 KCAS.  Actual 
airspeed at release, however, was less than the allowable tolerance at 487 KCAS.  Consequently, a test plan 
amendment was required to use that point as valid, and the option to omit jettison event 11 was no longer 
available.  Here again, it was anticipated that the magnitude of the outboard yaw generated by proximity to 
the inboard external fuel tank would continue to increase, further decreasing the MMR predicted for this 
event.  Separation was still predicted to be safe for the test conditions.  Review of photo and video sources 
indicate that the JSOW STV-C separated from the host aircraft, pitched significantly nose down, yawed 
significantly left and translated rapidly outboard after jettison.  From one of the wing cameras, the tail 
appears to hang vertically and track slowly toward the rear section of the external fuel tank as the JSOW 
nose tracked steadily downward, increasing the separation pitch angle.  Though in most camera views the 
JSOW appears to depart stable flight, the pylon camera clearly indicates the significant pitch is eventually 
damped before water impact.  Initial MDA predicted MMD for this event was 13.72 inches (table E-1), 
revised before flight to 16.0 inches by TI, and to 19.0 inches by  MDA.  Actual MMD for this jettison was 
computed post-flight to be 13.0 inches (TI) and 15.5 inches (MDA).  Flight test results compared favorably 
overall with both TI and MDA revised values. 
 
Jettison Event 11.  Jettison event 11 was conducted at 528 KCAS.  Predicted separation characteristics 
were to follow the developing trend in JSOW separation adjacent to an external fuel tank, and pitch 
dramatically nose down with rapid onset of a rapid outboard yaw rate.  Photo data indicated that separation 
characteristics were much the same as noted during jettison event 10, excepting that apparent rates were 
increased.  The JSOW STV-C exhibited a dramatic yaw excursion within 10 ft below the aircraft, as 
confirmed by the data presented in table E-6, where 6-DOF separation data for the first 0.80 second after 
jettison is presented.  Peak outboard yaw of 95.54 deg apparently occurred at 0.60 sec after jettison.  
However, the nose camera film indicates that the store yaw direction reversed shortly after jettison, and 
departed stable flight passing approximately 90 deg yaw in the opposite direction.  Peak recorded pitch 
angle reached 45.19 deg (nose down), also at 0.60 sec after jettison.  Roll angle was characteristically 
oscillatory for this jettison.  Initial MDA predicted MMD for this event remained unchanged at 11.27 
inches (table E-1), though TI predicted MMD of 14.0 inches.  Actual MMD for this jettison was computed 
post-flight to be 14.0 inches (TI) and 11.1 inches (MDA).  Flight test results compared favorably overall 
with both TI and MDA revised values. 
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Jettison Event 12.  Separation characteristics for the 551 KCAS jettison event 12 were even more dramatic 
than discovered during the preceding jettison.  The JSOW STV-C pitched down and yawed outboard 
immediately and significantly upon release, and rapidly tracked outboard of the aircraft.  Yaw angle was in 
excess of 90 degrees within 10 ft of the aircraft, as indicated by 6-DOF separation data presented as table 
E-7.  Peak outboard yaw of 98.32 deg occurred at 0.60 sec after jettison, and was accompanied by a pitch 
angle of 43.75 deg nose down 9.55 ft below the launch aircraft.  Figure A-11 dramatically depicts JSOW 
separation characteristics at jettison event 12 flight conditions in the JSOW jettison mode.  Review of 
photographic data reveals that the JSOW tail appears to float across toward the external fuel tank while the 
JSOW nose tracks rapidly down and outboard, before the entirety of the store suddenly tracks rapidly 
outboard.  Initial MDA predicted MMD for this event was 8.95 inches (table E-1), revised before flight to 
15.5 inches by TI, and to 10.0 inches by  MDA.  Actual MMD for this jettison was computed post-flight to 
be 16.0 inches (TI) and 7.8 inches (MDA).  TI post-flight analysis for JSOW jettison event 12 is presented 
as figure E-9.  Photographic evidence of this separation tends to favor the MDA conclusion with respect to 
miss distance. 
 
Jettison Event 13.  Per table E-1, the separating store was initially predicted to impact the external fuel tank 
during jettison at the target test airspeed of 575 KCAS.  Accordingly, all preceding test points were 
necessarily considered build-up to this and the next endpoint jettison tests.  During the first attempt to reach 
test conditions, however, it was discovered that the aircraft lacked sufficient power in level flight to 
overcome the additional drag induced by carriage of multiple on-board cameras.  As a result, the bomb 
used to counterbalance the JSOW was down-loaded, and the flight successfully reattempted on the 
following day.  Jettison event 13 was completed at 573 KCAS.  Separation characteristics predictions are 
presented in figure E-4, which represents MDA analysis based upon initial wind tunnel data (with none of 
the recurring MDA SDF model corrections added), and in figure E-10, which conveys the updated 6-DOF 
model analysis completed by TI prior to each flight.  MDA MMD prediction based upon combined 
integrated telemetry, SDF prediction and photogrammetric analysis is presented in figure E-14.  Review of 
photo and video sources indicate that separation of the JSOW STV-C at 573 KCAS was similar to the 
preceding 551 KCAS test point, but even more extreme.  Again, the store pitched down and yawed 
outboard immediately and significantly upon release, and rapidly tracked outboard of the aircraft.  Yaw 
angle was in excess of 90 degrees within 10 ft of the aircraft, as indicated by 6-DOF separation data 
presented as table E-8.  Peak outboard yaw of 103.30 deg occurred at 0.60 sec after jettison, and was 
accompanied by a pitch angle of 58.90 deg nose down 9.67 ft below the launch aircraft.  Pitch angle 
continued to diverge past 65 deg nose down as the store departed stable flight.  Wing video confirmed that 
the JSOW STV-C clearly missed the external fuel tank, but the minimum miss distance appeared to 
approach the 6 inch minimum allowed.  Initial MDA predicted MMD for this event was 0.00 (contact) in 
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(table E-1), revised before flight to 7.5 inches by TI, and to 5.4 inches by  MDA.  TI post-flight analysis for 
JSOW jettison event 13 is presented as figure E-11.  MDA combined post-flight analysis for integrated 
telemetry, the MDA SDF model and photogrammetric analysis is shown in figure E-15.  Actual MMD for 
this jettison was computed post-flight to be 7.8 inches (TI) and 8.0 inches (MDA).  Actual separation 
MMD was better than predicted for this test event. 
 
Jettison Event 14.  This jettison event, conducted at 583 KCAS in a 45 deg dive, was the endpoint test for 
the JSOW separation test program.  Here again, the separating store was initially predicted to impact the 
external fuel tank during jettison at the target test airspeed of 575 KCAS (table E-1).  The initial MDA 
separation characteristics prediction is presented in figure E-5 (with none of the recurring MDA SDF model 
corrections added).  Revised MMD estimates were 3.3 inches by TI, and 2.3 inches by  MDA.  Review of 
photo and video sources indicate that this separation was almost identical to the preceding.  The separating 
JSOW STV-C rapidly yawed outboard and pitched nose down while the tail approached the external fuel 
tank.  Computed MMD was not available for this report, but comparison of photo and video indicate 
separation comparable to jettison event 13, and therefore on the order of 8 inches MMD.  Again, separation 
was better than predicted for this test. 
 
JSOW STV-C Inboard Jettison in Sequence with Analysis 
 
Separation flight testing of JSOW from the inboard station was initially planned for six events, sequentially 
progressing from lower airspeed and no adjacent HARM conditions to 575 KCAS and adjacent HARM 
conditions.  In the course of flight testing and data analysis, it was determined that jettison events number 
15, 16 and 18 (400, 425 and 525 KCAS, respectively) could be safely skipped.  For the remainder of the 
jettison test events from the inboard station, those tests were conducted with the gear UP and flaps AUTO, 
and in the test loadings indicated in table B-2, loadings 3 and 4.  Flight test aircraft, date of test, aircrew and 
jettison test point parameters are as listed in table B-3.  Analysis of applicable flight test data sources for 
each jettison test are presented in the following paragraphs.  All tests met the separation characteristics 
requirements of the Specification, reference 8, and all test point parameters were achieved within 
established tolerances. 
 
Jettison Event 17.  This test event was the first release of a Joint Standoff Weapon from the inboard station 
of the F/A-18.  Conducted at 504 KCAS, separation for this was predicted to be benign, with only moderate 
nose down pitch attitude and very little roll or yaw predicted as the store fell away from the aircraft 
(depicted in figure E-6).  Six degree of freedom separation data for the first 0.8 second after jettison is 
presented as table E-9.  Review of photo and video sources indicate that the JSOW STV-C separated 
cleanly from the host aircraft, pitched nose down and separated vertically after jettison.  TI post-flight 
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analysis for JSOW jettison event 17 is presented as figure E-12.   Flight test results matched fairly closely 
with both TI and MDA predicted values, but the critical parameter for inboard separation, pitch, was less 
than anticipated.  The TI maximum pitch angle of 24.4 deg nose down was predicted at 0.40 sec following 
jettison, and the MDA prediction conveyed a maximum pitch angle of 28.4 deg nose down 0.5 sec after 
jettison. Flight test indicated a maximum pitch angle of 21.7 deg nose down occurred at 0.40 sec after 
jettison, resulting in revision to the 6-DOF and SDF separation models for the inboard station.  This 
revision was critical, as initial MDA wind tunnel analysis predicted a store to pylon impact at 575 KCAS 
(jettison event 20). 
 
Jettison Event 19.  Due to fidelity of TI and MDA predictive models and confidence of the test team that 
separation characteristics were adequately estimated by those models, the 525 KCAS jettison event 18 was 
skipped.  Jettison event 19 was conducted at 550 KCAS.  It was anticipated that the magnitude of the initial 
nose down pitch would be moderately increased (to approximately 33 deg), thereby decreasing the 
minimum miss distance (JSOW tail to pylon) predicted for this event.  Nonetheless, separation was 
predicted to be safe for the test conditions.  Review of photo and video sources indicate that the JSOW 
STV-C separated cleanly from the host aircraft, but the tail appeared to hang in place until a significant 
nose down pitch attitude had been reached, whereupon the store continued to separate from the launch 
aircraft.  Very little roll or yaw was noted throughout the separation.  Flight test results matched closely 
with both TI and MDA revised models. 
 
Jettison Event 20.  Jettison event 20 was the final jettison event in the JSOW separation test program.  It 
established the endpoint for the inboard station at a test airspeed of 579 KCAS.  Though it was anticipated 
that the presence of an AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) on the outboard station 
would have virtually no effect on the resulting trajectory of a JSOW released from the inboard pylon, that 
test loading was used to prove the analysis.  Initial MDA wind tunnel analysis indicated that a JSOW to 
pylon collision would occur at 0.95 IMN and 575 KCAS due to the large post-jettison nose down pitch, as 
indicated in figure E-7.  Analysis of jettison event 17 indicated that the nose down pitch separation 
characteristic was much less pronounced than expected, and both the TI and MDA models (6-DOF and 
SDF) were updated to reflect this new information.  Figures E-8 and E-13 depict revised expectations for 
the jettison test event per MDA and TI, respectively.  As with the preceding test, review of photo and video 
sources indicate that the JSOW STV-C separated cleanly from the host aircraft.  The store tracked down 
approximately 6 inches with the ejector stroke, whereupon the JSOW nosed down to approximately 30 deg 
pitch attitude and continued movement vertically away from the launch aircraft.  No appreciable lateral 
movement either toward the outboard HARM or the fuselage station CATM-7 missile was noted.  Flight 
test results matched closely with both TI and MDA revised models. 
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Results and Discussion - Launch 
 
JSOW STV-F Launch General Information 
 
As the first JSOW launch was accelerated from the original schedule, the program decision was made to 
reduce risk by conducting the first launch not at the “most severe jettison condition” as originally planned, 
but at a lower airspeed and without the adjacent inboard station fuel tank.  Consequently, the captive flight 
test and first launch conditions were targeted for 500 KCAS in loading 5 as depicted in table B-2.  All 
launch related tests were conducted with the gear UP and flaps AUTO.  The launch test marked the 
transition point for the JSOW program from DT-IIA to DT-IIB.  The integrated test team included several 
members that would continue on into DT-IIB at China Lake, as the program transitioned.  Indicative of this 
team approach, CF-01 (a DT-IIA mission) was flown on a China Lake aircraft by local test aircrew.  CF-02 
and the subsequent launch flight was conducted on a Patuxent River aircraft with a Patuxent River pilot, 
supporting not only the stated DT-IIA objectives, but also a number of DT-IIB flight test objectives.  Flight 
test aircraft, date of test, aircrew and launch test point parameters are as listed in table B-3.  All test point 
parameters were achieved within established tolerances. 
 
JSOW STV-F Captive Flight Events (CF-01 and CF-02) 
 
Captive flight testing of the first JSOW STV-F was conducted in order to thoroughly test systems as much 
as possible in preparation for the launch test event.  Conduct of these flight enabled refinement of launch 
procedures, familiarity with communications and range procedures, and verification of JSOW STV-F 
system functionality (specifically telemetry (TM) systems).  TM checkout consisted of JSOW three-phase 
power application, completion of the weapon initiated built-in-test (IBIT), and a single set of maneuvers 
conducted on the downwind leg of the practice run.  A target area TM checkout to explore each axis of the 
JSOW instrumentation was completed as a by-product of the Sim Launch operations.  Sim Launch was 
effected by cycling the IR COOL switch from OFF to ORIDE in a specific sequence.  Data were recorded 
from aircraft as well as weapon TM on the ground, and from aircraft systems onto the on-board parameter 
recording system.  Cameras were turned on to verify operation at approximately 10 seconds prior to Sim 
Launch on the first run, and secured after they had run out.  Control of the STV-F Sim Launch mode via 
modified procedures was effective.  Though a few issues were discovered concerning reliable receipt of 
aircraft TM and sensing of FTS activation radio tones, the captive carriage flights were highly successful 
overall, and all critical systems were verified for proper operation or identified for resolution prior to 
launch.  As a result, the decision was made to combine flight objectives of DR-01 into the practice runs for 
FF-01, and if successful, accelerate the first launch even further. 
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JSOW STV-F Captive Flight Event (DR-01) 
 
The “Dress Rehearsal” event (DR-01) comprised the normal launch communication and procedures plus 
flight through the expected JSOW flight path (practice for the chase aircraft as well as JSOW TM 
verification) as well as another practice run up to the launch point to confirm aircraft TM operational status.  
The first run was overall successful, with the exception of a TM dropout at the jettison point.  The decision 
was made to repeat this run to ensure that the TM dropout was a one-time occurrence and not related to the 
flight profile.  TM was satisfactory for the entirety of the second run, thereby completing the test objective 
of DR-01 to “verify correct operation of the JSOW in a captive environment.” 
 
JSOW STV-F Free Flight Launch Event (FF-01) 
 
This test event was the first launch of a Joint Standoff Weapon from the F/A-18.  Conducted at 505 KCAS, 
separation for this was predicted to be benign, with the slight nose down pitch attitude and minimal roll and 
yaw noted for the comparable jettison condition countered by the flight controls as the store fell away from 
the aircraft.  Following sequentially after DR-01, two runs with intent to launch were aborted prior to the 
final successful launch.  The first live run was aborted due to a temporary communication failure in the 
FTS structure (Van 2).  The second live run was aborted due to poor weapon leveling performance caused 
by a commanded course correction late in the delivery.  Aircraft autopilot and auto-throttle systems were 
used to aid in stabilizing test point parameters, despite moderate turbulence at test altitude.  Release consent 
was used to initiate the STV-F batteries, and once all systems were “GO”, the normal aircraft Select 
Jettison procedures were used to release the weapon.  Review of photo and video sources indicate that the 
STV-F separated cleanly from the host aircraft, activated tail control fins approximately 1 ft below the 
pylon, and apparently controlled motion in pitch, roll and yaw to virtually zero.  Comparison of STV-F 
controlled separation to STV-C jettison event 3 separation reveals that peak jettison pitch of 17.0 deg nose 
down was reduced to 5.5 deg (starting point on pylon was 3 deg nose down), peak jettison yaw of 4.8 deg 
outboard was reduced to 1.2 deg, and peak jettison roll of 3.0 deg right was reduced to 1.0 deg.  Wing 
deployment occurred as designed 2.5 sec after launch, and JSOW course corrections were evident 7.0 sec 
after launch.  The JSOW STV-F appeared to be stable throughout time of flight, until FTS activation 
severed the tail after 2 min and 54 sec of flight.  The weapon main body was found with wings still intact, 
and the mid-section along with the TIK was for the most part intact as well.  The control section was found 
intact approximately 1,000 ft south of the main body.  The JSOW STV-F Free Flight Launch Event (FF-01) 
successfully met each of its DT-IIA and DT-IIB flight test objectives.  Separation and free-flight for the 
first launch event are depicted in figures A-12 and A-13.   Launch separation characteristics met the 
requirements of the Specification, reference 8. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Conclusions 
 
General Conclusions 
 
The general objective of AGM-154A JSOW separation flight testing was to clear the F/A-18A/B/C/D 
envelope for jettison and launch out to the limits of the systems specification (reference 1), 0.60 to 0.95 
IMN, +10 to -45degrees pitch angle (and 15 degrees roll) and release altitudes from 200 ft AGL to 30,000 
ft MSL.  As amplified by specific conclusions noted in following paragraphs, AGM-154A JSOW 
separation characteristic in the jettison mode were satisfactory throughout the entire envelope.  Launch 
testing in DT-IIA was truncated at 500 KCAS with no adjacent store, versus the full envelope originally 
envisioned.  Separation characteristics for launch were satisfactory throughout the envelope tested.  
Overall, jettison and launch separation characteristics of the AGM-154A Joint Standoff Weapon were 
satisfactory for the Ground Attack mission. 
 
Effectiveness of Methodology 
 
Because a sizable program investment was made into multiple redundant data sources, modeling and 
simulation, it is reasonable to comment upon the effectiveness and impact of that investment.  Specifically, 
the value of the methodology whereby data from on-board telemetry systems and post-flight 
photogrammetric analysis was fed back into 6-DOF (TI) and SDF (MDA) wind-tunnel analysis based 
models to predict separation characteristics is hereby addressed.  First and foremost, that iterative process 
was shown to be invaluable toward increasing the fidelity of both models, and increasing test team 
confidence in safe execution of the next test in sequence.  Though rigorous discussion of cost-effectiveness 
is beyond the scope of this document, it was shown that the cost associated with the iterative modeling 
process was more than compensated in cost and schedule by the omission of five JSOW STV-C test points, 
two of which would have required post-flight photogrammetric analysis.  Furthermore, had test tolerances 
for jettison test event 10 not been exceeded (low airspeed), the potential was there to skip the next point in 
sequence (and that post-flight photogrammetric analysis), as well.  For the high profile JSOW test program, 
the iterative modeling and simulation used throughout separation testing was extremely effective at 
improving overall test safety and efficient use of extremely expensive test assets. 
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AGM-154A JSOW Jettison Envelope 
 
Outboard Stations (2 and 8), Jettison Mode.  Jettison separation characteristics of the AGM-154A JSOW 
were thoroughly evaluated from the outboard station of an F/A-18C with and without the presence of the 
worst-case adjacent inboard store (the external fuel tank).  Though store separation clearly was approaching 
minimum allowable at worst-case conditions, characteristics noted were satisfactory up to test limits of 575 
KCAS and 0.95 IMN and -45degrees pitch angle.  Jettison of this store only requires safe separation from 
the aircraft, as functional weapon employment is no longer viable in that mode.  Therefore, the unstable 
characteristics demonstrated at high speeds following safe separation from the aircraft are not relevant to 
this specific conclusion.  Jettison separation characteristics of the AGM-154A JSOW from the outboard 
stations (2 and 8) with and without the presence of an adjacent external fuel tank were satisfactory for the 
Ground Attack mission. 
 
Inboard Stations (3 and 7), Jettison Mode.  Jettison separation characteristics of the AGM-154A JSOW 
were evaluated from the inboard station of an F/A-18C with and without the presence of the worst-case 
adjacent outboard store (the High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile, or HARM).  Though the significant nose 
down pitch angle observed at high speed was a concern regarding potential JSOW tail impact to pylon, 
characteristics noted were satisfactory up to test limits of 575 KCAS and 0.95 IMN in level flight.  Jettison 
separation characteristics from the inboard station in any condition other than level were not determined 
and cannot be extrapolated from these tests.  Jettison separation characteristics of the AGM-154A JSOW 
from the inboard stations (3 and 7) with and without the presence of an adjacent outboard HARM were 
satisfactory for the Ground Attack mission. 
 
AGM-154A JSOW Launch Envelope 
 
Separation characteristics of the AGM-154A JSOW in normal launch mode were evaluated from the 
outboard station of an F/A-18C without any adjacent inboard store.  Separation characteristics noted were, 
as predicted, better than jettison at comparable conditions, and were satisfactory up to test limits of 500 
KCAS and 0.82 IMN in level flight.  Separation characteristics of the AGM-154A JSOW in normal launch 
mode from the outboard stations (2 and 8) without the presence of any adjacent store were satisfactory for 
the Ground Attack mission. 
 
JSOW STV-F Readiness For Follow-On Testing (DT-IIB) 
 
Launch Envelope Limitations.  Separation characteristics of the AGM-154A JSOW in normal launch mode 
were only evaluated from the outboard station of an F/A-18C without any adjacent inboard store, and only 
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up to test limits of 500 KCAS and 0.82 IMN in level flight.  Test methodology was planned to demonstrate 
better separation characteristics of the JSOW launch mode than the JSOW jettison mode at the worst-case 
conditions, confirmed in this document as 575 KCAS and 0.95 IMN in the presence of an adjacent external 
fuel tank.  In so doing, the entire launch envelope would have been cleared to match the jettison envelope 
tested.  As overall JSOW program requirements dictated a change in test design, the total envelope cleared 
for launch was necessarily reduced to those conditions tested, and that part of the launch envelope inclusive 
of an adjacent external fuel tank and up to 575 KCAS and 0.95 IMN remains to be demonstrated in DT-IIB 
prior to fleet clearance. 
 
Wing Deployment.  Wing deployment characteristics of the JSOW STV-F in normal launch mode were 
evaluated following separation testing during the first JSOW STV-F launch.  Wing deployment 
characteristics noted were satisfactory up to test launch limits of 500 KCAS and 0.82 IMN in level flight.  
Wing deployment characteristics of the JSOW STV-F in normal launch mode were satisfactory for 
continued development in DT-IIB. 
 
Free Flight Characteristics.  Free flight characteristics of the JSOW STV-F were evaluated following 
separation testing during the first JSOW STV-F launch.  Free flight characteristics noted were satisfactory 
from test launch limits of 500 KCAS and 0.82 IMN in level flight to activation of the Flight Termination 
System.  Free flight characteristics of the JSOW STV-F were satisfactory for continued development in 
DT-IIB. 
 
Flight Termination System (FTS).  The FTS of the JSOW STV-F was evaluated following separation 
testing during the first JSOW STV-F launch.  FTS characteristics noted were satisfactory, as activation of 
that system immediately terminated free flight of the weapon upon ground-initiated signal.  The JSOW 
STV-F FTS was satisfactory for continued development in DT-IIB. 
 
Structural Integrity.  Structural integrity of the JSOW STV-F was evaluated during and following 
separation testing of the first JSOW STV-F launch.  Structural integrity was found to be robust throughout 
the separation event, wing deployment, free flight, FTS activation and ground impact.  The JSOW STV-F 
structural integrity was satisfactory for continued development in DT-IIB. 
 
Specification Conformance 
 
The AGM-154A JSOW jettison and launch separation characteristics met all requirements of the MIL-
STD-1763A specification, reference 8, against which it was tested.  Wing deployment and free flight 
characteristics as well as FTS performance and structural integrity were not compared to any specification. 
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Recommendations 
 
General Recommendation 
 
The author recommends flight clearance for the AGM-154A Joint Standoff Weapon from F/A-18C/D 
aircraft in the jettison and launch modes subject to the limitations of specific recommendations. 
 
Specific Recommendations 
 
1. For future test programs that may benefit from the extensive lessons learned with iterative modeling 
and simulation using multiple data sources in this test program, the author recommends consideration of 
methodology similar to that used for AGM-154A JSOW.  Furthermore, if high-speed photography is to be 
used for a test program, the author recommends the relatively inexpensive option of targeting separating 
stores for potential photogrammetric analysis. 
 
2. The JSOW program clearly benefited from the close interaction of an Integrated Test Team composed 
of knowledgeable industry and government representatives across a spectrum of disciplines.  The author 
emphatically recommends use of the Integrated Test Team concept for future test programs, wherever 
feasible. 
 
3. For JSOW jettison from F/A-18C/D outboard stations (2 and 8) with or without adjacent Tactical 
Manual authorized inboard station stores, the author recommends flight clearance up to 575 KCAS and 
0.95 IMN, +10 to -45degrees pitch angle (up to 15 degrees roll) and all release altitudes. 
 
4. For JSOW jettison from F/A-18C/D inboard stations (3 and 7) with or without adjacent Tactical 
Manual authorized fuselage station and outboard station stores, the author recommends flight clearance up 
to 575 KCAS and 0.95 IMN, level flight (up to 15 degrees roll) and all release altitudes. 
 
5. For JSOW launch from F/A-18C/D outboard stations (2 and 8) without adjacent inboard station stores, 
the author recommends flight clearance up to 500 KCAS and 0.82 IMN, level flight (up to 15 degrees roll) 
and all release altitudes without restriction. 
 
6. For JSOW launch from F/A-18C/D outboard stations (2 and 8) without adjacent inboard station stores, 
the author recommends flight clearance up to 575 KCAS and 0.95 IMN, +10 to -45degrees pitch angle (up 
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to 15 degrees roll) and all release altitudes, restricted to DT-IIB testing with a qualified test pilot until 
satisfactory separation characteristics in the launch mode have been demonstrated during that test phase. 
 
7. For JSOW launch from F/A-18C/D outboard stations (2 and 8) with adjacent Tactical Manual 
authorized inboard station stores, the author recommends flight clearance up to 575 KCAS and 0.95 IMN, 
+10 to -45degrees pitch angle (up to 15 degrees roll) and all release altitudes, restricted to DT-IIB testing 
with a qualified test pilot until satisfactory separation characteristics in the launch mode have been 
demonstrated during that test phase. 
 
8. For JSOW launch from F/A-18C/D inboard stations (3 and 7) with or without adjacent Tactical 
Manual authorized fuselage station and outboard station stores, the author recommends flight clearance up 
to 500 KCAS and 0.82 IMN, level flight (up to 15 degrees roll) and all release altitudes without restriction. 
 
9. For JSOW launch from F/A-18C/D inboard stations (3 and 7) with or without adjacent Tactical 
Manual authorized fuselage station and outboard station stores, the author recommends flight clearance up 
to 575 KCAS and 0.95 IMN, level flight (up to 15 degrees roll) and all release altitudes, restricted to DT-
IIB testing with a qualified test pilot until satisfactory separation characteristics in the launch mode have 
been demonstrated during that test phase (from any condition more critical than jettison event 20). 
 
10. For JSOW jettison or launch from F/A-18C/D inboard stations (3 and 7) with or without adjacent 
Tactical Manual authorized fuselage station and outboard station stores, up to the full envelope of 575 
KCAS and 0.95 IMN, +10 to -45degrees pitch angle (up to 15 degrees roll) and all release altitudes, the 
author recommends additional flight testing. 
 
11. Considering launch envelope restrictions, JSOW wing deployment and free flight characteristics, FTS 
performance and JSOW apparent structural integrity to ground impact, the author recommends transition of 
the test program into DT-IIB. 
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CHAPTER IX 
EPILOGUE 
 
Continued Development of the AGM-154A JSOW 
 
Following successful completion of the first JSOW launch on 13 December 2004, the Conventional 
Weapons Program Manager (PMA-201) for JSOW had this to say (NAWCWD, 1995):  
 
“My congratulations to the entire JSOW TEAM.  Our successful flight of STV-F1 on 
December 13th marks the culmination of lots of hard work to meet a challenge to fly 
before the Christmas holidays.  You all did it!  JSOW has spread its wings! 
Very Respectfully, J.V. Chenevey (The Proud PMA of JSOW)” 
 
At the completion of DT-IIA, much was yet to be done to make JSOW fully operational.  The DT-IIB 
phase of flight testing commenced immediately upon completion of the first launch, and the first Advanced 
Development Model (ADM) version of JSOW was launched on 15 March 1995 (TI, 17 March 1995).  
Following ten out of eleven successful launches, DT-IIB was completed in December of 1995.  Operational 
Testing (OT) commenced in February 1997, and following 42 for 44 successful launch tests, OT completed 
later that same year.  As a result of fleet demand, JSOW test articles were deployed aboard USS Nimitz in 
1997, and those test articles were transferred ship-to-ship to remain in the combat theater until replaced 
with production models.  In December of 1998, the Raytheon Company (now the parent company of Texas 
Instruments) was awarded the Full Rate Production (FRP) contract for the first lot of JSOW.  As a result of 
another urgent fleet request following Operation Desert Fox in December of 1998, the initial JSOW 
production units were shipped from storage to the USS Vinson, deployed in support of Operation Southern 
Watch (OSW) (Global Security, 2005).  On the 21st of January 1999, the Program Executive Officer for 
Tactical Aviation (PEO(T)) released the message declaring Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for the 
AGM-154A Joint Standoff Weapon.  On the 25th of January, just four days later, three JSOW were 
launched in combat at anti-aircraft defense sites in Iraq that had been threatening coalition aircraft (News 
Review, 17 February 1999). 
 
Combat Employment 
 
By spring of 2000, 62 AGM-154A JSOW had been used in combat, 51 of which had been launched at Iraqi 
targets in support of Operation Southern Watch.  Another 11 JSOW were launched at targets in 1999 
during Operation Allied Force, and achieved a 100 percent success rate as those weapons performed 
precisely as designed and hit their intended aimpoint (Tester, 28 September 2000).  In a February 2001 
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OSW strike, a JSOW guidance problem surfaced related to the wind correction algorithm, as 26 of 28 
JSOW missed their intended aimpoints (Arkin, 2001).  That problem has since been corrected.  Throughout 
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the AGM-154A JSOW was again the weapon 
of choice.  To date, over 400 of these weapons have been launched in combat, and have provided the 
lethality from standoff critical to survivability in modern warfare (Global Security, 2005). 
 
Evolution of JSOW 
 
When JSOW became a “joint” program in 1992, development was planned for two additional variants of 
the Joint Standoff Weapon, the AGM-154B and the AGM-154C.  The AGM-154B was designed to carry 
six BLU-108 submunitions that in turn were designed to dispense four projectiles capable of detecting and 
attacking infrared targets.  After much development effort, the United States Air Force (USAF) cancelled 
the AGM-154B program in favor of a variant of the Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (Aviation Week, 
2003).  The AGM-154C was developed solely for use by the United States Navy.  This JSOW variant was 
designed to include a unitary warhead and an imaging infrared seeker with Autonomous Target Acquisition 
(ATA) technology.  The Navy selected the BAE Systems BROACH (Bomb Royal Ordnance Augmenting 
Charge) warhead for the AGM-154C (Tester, 11 June 1998), and development for this warhead proceeded 
in parallel to the unitary JSOW.  First flight of the AGM-154C JSOW occurred late in 2001, the FRP 
contract was awarded in December 2004 and IOC was declared in February 2005.  Continued evolution of 
the AGM-154 JSOW includes plans for integration of a weapon data link and production of a lower cost 
unitary variant containing the 500 pound BLU-111 warhead (designated the AGM-154A-1).  The USAF 
withdrew from the “joint” JSOW program in the fall of 2003, effectively increasing the unit cost for Navy 
acquisition (NAVAIR, 21 December 2005).  As a result, the Navy and industry teamed to pursue lower cost 
variants, since designated as Block II and Block III JSOW.  The Block III weapon will include data link to 
enable the engagement of moving targets.  Over 2,000 JSOW have been delivered to date, and the weapon 
capability has been integrated on F/A-18C/D, F/A-18E/F, F-16, F-15E, B-52, B-1B and B-2 aircraft.  It will 
be integrated on the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35), as well (Tester, 1 December 2005). 
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APPENDIX A: FIGURES 
 
 
Figure A-1 
Author and Plane Captain with Photogrammetric Targets Depicted 
 
 
Figure A-2 
Photogrammetric Targets on Aircraft and JSOW STV-F Pre-Launch 
 51 
 
 
 
 
 
IR COOL 
SWITCH
EMERG JETT 
PUSH BUTTON 
SELECT JETT 
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Figure A-3 
F/A-18A Cockpit Indicating IR COOL Switch, Emergency Jettison and Select Jettison Push Buttons  
 
Source: NAVAIR A1-F18AC-NFM-00, NATOPS Flight Manual F/A-18A/B/C/D Aircraft, 15 January 1991. 
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Figure A-4 
AGM-154A JSOW Exploded View 
 
Source: Texas Instruments, JSOW TRR F/A-18, AV-8B, A-6E, F-14 Fit Checks Meeting Minutes, 4 October 1993. 
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Figure A-5 
JSOW STV-F Components 
 
Source: Adapted from LT D. Hinson, Mr. M. Griffith, NAWCAD T&E Engineering / Aircraft Test Wing Atlantic Project Test Plan  
1689, 9 September 1994. 
 
 
Figure A-6 
JSOW STV-F TIK Mechanical Layout 
 
Source: Adapted from LT D. Hinson, Mr. M. Griffith, NAWCAD T&E Engineering / Aircraft Test Wing Atlantic Project Test Plan 
1689, 9 September 1994. 
 54 
 
SEE NOTE (1)
SEE NOTE (2) 
Figure A-7 
F/A-18 JSOW Test Camera Configuration 
 
Notes: (1) Nose camera No. HX01 applies to F/A-18C BuNo 163476 (#101) only. 
(2) Port wing tip camera configuration in accordance with local flight clearance restrictions and 
configuration requirements (third camera optional). 
(3) Downward looking 1-PL camera with 90 degree lens mounted in aft section of station 2 pylon 
(pylon S/N LEY-122). 
(4) Downward looking SEKAI video camera with 90 degree lens mounted in port wing Sparrow 
radar cavity of F/A-18C BuNo 163476 (#101) only. 
 
 
Source: Adapted from LT D. Hinson, Mr. M. Griffith, NAWCAD FTEG Project Test Plan 1571, 10 February 1994. 
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Figure A-8 
JSOW Jettison 1-1 
 
 
Figure A-9 
JSOW Jettison 1-2 
 
 
Figure A-10 
JSOW Jettison 1-3 
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Figure A-11 
JSOW Jettison Event 12 
 
 
Figure A-12 
JSOW STV-F Launch 
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Figure A-13 
JSOW STV-F Free Flight 
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APPENDIX B: TABLES 
 
 
 
 
Table B-1 
Detailed JSOW STV-F Launch Wing Deployment Timeline 
Event Time (sec) 
Release Consent -20.000 
Actuator Battery -18.400 
Control Fins Lock Release -17.400 
Control Fins to 2 deg -17.200 
Control Fins to Zero -17.000 
Final Go / No-Go -5.000 
Hooks Open 0.000 
Umbilical Separation 0.039 
First Command to Control Section (Worst Case) 0.052 
Start Pitch Accelerator Control 0.350 
Begin Ramp to Wings Deployed 
Angle of Attack Limits (30 ft Vertical Separation) 1.210 
Start Yaw Acceleration Control 1.500 
Start Wing Deployment 1.560 
Start Flight Path Hold Parallel to Host 
Aircraft Path at Release 2.100 
Begin Outboard Skid 2.100 
Full Wing Deployment 2.800 (earliest) 3.560 (latest) 
Start Roll Integrator 4.135 
Lateral Avoidance Distance Achieved, 
Begin Max L/D Pull-Up 5.281 
Flight Termination System Minimum Arm Time 7.000 
Complete Outboard Skid 7.300 
Pull-Up through Host Aircraft Plane of Flight, 
Begin Bank-to-Turn Control 7.882 
 
Source: Adapted from LT D. Hinson, Mr. M. Griffith, NAWCAD T&E Engineering / Aircraft Test Wing Atlantic Project Test Plan  
1689, 9 September 1994.
 Table B-2 
F/A-18 JSOW Flight Test Loadings 
AIRCRAFT STATION NUMBER LOAD 1     2(1) 3(1) 4  5 6 7 8 9 REMARKS 
1  2 CAM JSOW STV-C 
EMPTY 
PYLON 2 CAM 
FUEL 
TANK EMPTY 
EMPTY 
PYLON MK 82
(3) BALLAST 2 TAIL CAM BuNo 163476 had 3 CAM Stations 1 and 4 
2(2) 3 CAM JSOW STV-C 
EMPTY 
FUEL 
TANK 
3 CAM EMPTY PYLON EMPTY 
EMPTY 
FUEL 
TANK 
MK 82 BALLAST NOSE CAM, 2 TAIL CAM,  Video at AIM-7 Wing Antenna Location 
3   3 CAM EMPTY PYLON 
JSOW 
STV-C CATM-7
(4) 
EMPTY 
FUEL 
TANK 
EMPTY MK 83(3) EMPTY PYLON BALLAST 
NOSE CAM, 2 TAIL CAM,  
Video at AIM-7 Wing Antenna Location 
4  EMPTY AGM-88 
(5) 
HARM 
JSOW 
STV-C CATM-7 
EMPTY 
FUEL 
TANK 
EMPTY MK 83 MK 83 EMPTY NOSE CAM, 2 TAIL CAM,  Video at AIM-7 Wing Antenna Location 
5  3 CAM JSOW STV-F 
EMPTY 
PYLON 3 CAM 
FUEL 
TANK EMPTY 
EMPTY 
PYLON MK 83 BALLAST 
NOSE CAM, 2 TAIL CAM,  
Video at AIM-7 Wing Antenna Location 
Notes: (1) Stations 2 and 3 pylons contained a the pylon camera when JSOW installed for release on that station. 
(2) Empty Fuel Tank station 7 downloaded in order to make release conditions for flight event 13. 
(3) MK 82 represents and inert 500 lb bomb assembly.  MK 83 represents an inert 1,000 lb bomb assembly. 
(4) CATM-7 represents a captive (inert) 500 lb AIM-7 air-to-air missile. 
(5) AGM-88 HARM represents a captive (inert) 1,000 lb High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile. 
(6) Flight test cameras are indicated by “CAM”, where appropriate.  The Nose Camera and Wing Video loadings were only installed on aircraft bureau number 163476. 
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 Table B-3 
F/A-18 JSOW Flight Test Event Matrix 
RELEASE CONDITIONS TEST 
EVENT LOAD 
EVT 
NO. BUNO   DATE PILOT ALT (ft HP) 
AIRSPEED 
(KCAS) 
ACCEL 
(g) 
FPA 
(deg) IMN 
REMARKS 
JETTISON 1 1 161925 8 MAR 94 Hinson 5,012 401 1.0 0 0.66 First JSOW Jettison 
JETTISON           1 2 161925 7 APR 94 Rader 4,984 445 1.0 0 0.73  
JETTISON 1 3 161925 14 APR 94 Thomas 4,992 497 1.1 0 0.81  
JETTISON 1 4 161925 26 APR 94 Reuter N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A In-Flight ABORT 
JETTISON 1 4 161925 28 APR 94 Bouchard 4,964 550 1.03 0 0.90  
JETTISON 2 6 163476 18 MAY 94 Reuter 5,088 399 0.97 0 0.66  
JETTISON 1 5 163476 23 MAY 94 Everett  5,268 578 1.1 0 0.95  
JETTISON         2 7 N/A SKIP N/A 5,000 425 1.0 0 0.70 Planned Conditions – Point Skipped 
JETTISON 2 8 163476 31 MAY 94 Hinson 5,096 450 0.98 0 0.74  
JETTISON         2 9 N/A SKIP N/A 5,000 475 1.0 0 0.78 Planned Conditions – Point Skipped 
JETTISON 2 10 163476 20 JUN 94 Sturckow 5,116 487 1.17 0 0.80 Missed 500 KCAS Test Point (Low) 
JETTISON 2 11 163476 15 JUL 94 Mortenson 5,084 528 1.03 0 0.86  
JETTISON 2 12 163476 8 AUG 94 Hinson 5,140 551 1.0 0 0.90  
JETTISON 2 13 163476 31 AUG 94 Everett N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Target Release Conditions Not Attained 
JETTISON 2(1) 13 163476 1 SEP 94 Everett 5,310 573 1.0 0 0.94  
CAPTIVE 2 14 163476 12 OCT 94 Hinson N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Practice Flight for 45 degree Jettison 
JETTISON 2 14 163476 12 OCT 94 Hinson 6,025 583 0.7 -44 0.96 Endpoint for Outboard Jettison 
JETTISON          3 16(2) N/A SKIP N/A 5,000 450 1.0 0 0.74 Planned Conditions – Point Skipped 
JETTISON 3 17 163476 18 OCT 94 Traven 5,095 504 1.0 0 0.82 First Inboard Station Release 
JETTISON          3 18 N/A SKIP N/A 5,000 525 1.0 0 0.86 Planned Conditions – Point Skipped 
JETTISON 3 19 163476 2 NOV 94 Heins 5,060 550 1.0 0 0.90  
JETTISON 4 20 163476 1 DEC 94 Hinson 5,360 579 1.0 +1 0.95 Endpoint for Inboard Station 
CAPTIVE  - CF-01 114 6 DEC 94 Lee N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Wpns Test Sqdn China Lake Aircraft 
CAPTIVE  5 CF-02 163476 8 DEC 94 Hinson N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  
LAUNCH  5 FF-01(3) 163476 13 DEC 94 Hinson 5,142(4) 505 1.0 0 0.82 First Launch of JSOW 
Notes: (1) Station 7 External Fuel Tank was down-loaded in order to reduce drag to make this test point achievable. 
(2) Test Event 15 (425 KCAS inboard station jettison) was deleted before signature on the test plan amendment for the inboard station. 
(3) Test evaluation included a “Dress Rehearsal” (DR-01). 
(4) Altitude reported in ft MSL for this test. 
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APPENDIX C: BLU-97 COMBINED EFFECTS BOMBLET (CEB) 
 
The BLU-97 shown in figure C-1 was originally produced by AEROJET for the CBU-87 Combined Effects 
Munition (CEM) cluster bomb.  Under the JSOW contract, AEROJET transitioned the BLU-97 to an 
insensitive munition, designated the IM BLU-97A/B CEB.  Each BLU-97 bomblet was a cylinder 2.51 
inches in diameter and 6.65 inches in length (before dispense), and weighed 3.5 pounds.  Once the 
submunition was dispensed from the CBU-87, the spider assembly was designed to catch the airflow which 
shifted it rearward, withdrawing the Air Inflated Decelerator (AID) cup, also shown in figure C-1.  This 
action was designed to release the AID ballute and allow the spring loaded stand-off tube to extend forward 
by the compressed conical stand-off spring.  The JSOW variant of the BLU-97 used a Ram Air Decelerator 
(RAD) instead of the AID.  As the AID was inflated by the air stream, it was designed to orient and 
stabilize the submunition for proper target impact with the target or terrain, the stand-off tube was designed 
to slide rearward over the bomb body and support collar and strike the firing pin which impacts the 
piezoelectric crystal which initiates the explosive train.  As a backup, the BLU-97 had a secondary 
omnidirectional firing mechanism which would fire the submunition from any impact angle due to gravity 
forces.  An escapement device was designed to delay the arming sequence for one half to one second for 
safe separation purposes during dispense.  The bomblet had three kill mechanisms; a downward firing 
conical copper shaped charge, fragments produced when the blast of the bomblet’s main charge burst the 
scored-steel bomb case, and a zirconium sponge ring which was designed to provide incendiary fire starting 
capability on all surfaces. 
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Figure C-1 
BLU-97 Assembly and Operating Sequence 
 
Source: Adapted from LT D. Hinson, Mr. M. Griffith, NAWCAD FTEG Project Test Plan 1571, 10 February 1994. 
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APPENDIX D: JSOW LAUNCH DETAILED TIMELINE 
 
 
 
Figure D-1 
JSOW Launch Detailed Timeline 
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Notes: 
(A) When aircraft power applied, aircraft flight parameters must agree with those stored in the Power-On 
message within the following limits: 
 (1) Time of Day: N/A 
 (2) Latitude: ± 1 NM 
 (3) Longitude: ± 1 NM 
(B) During straight and level flight, aircraft must: 
 (1) Hold groundspeed to ± 10 knots change over 1 minute 
 (2) Hold airspeed to ± 10 KCAS at all times 
 (3) Hold pitch angle to ± 5 degrees of expected trim angle 
 (4) Hold roll angle to ± 5 degrees of zero 
(C) When Release Consent is applied, aircraft flight parameters must agree with those stored in the 
Preplanned Release message within these limits: 
 (1) Altitude: ± 250 feet 
 (2) Latitude: ± 0.5 NM 
 (3) Longitude: ± 0.5 NM 
 (4) Airspeed: ± 10 KCAS 
 (5) Ground Speed: ± 50 knots 
 (6) Pitch: ± 5 degrees 
 (7) Roll: ± 5 degrees 
 (8) Ground Track: ± 4 degrees 
 (9) Aircraft Crab Angle: ≤ 5 degrees  
 
 
Source: Adapted from LT D. Hinson, Mr. M. Griffith, NAWCAD T&E Engineering / Aircraft Test Wing Atlantic Project Test Plan  
1689, 9 September 1994.
 65 
APPENDIX E: DATA AND ANALYSIS TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table E-1 
MDA JSOW Outboard Station Jettison Analysis Summary(1) 
Outboard Pylon Jettison (Station 2 / 8) – Altitude 5,000 ft 
Configuration Mach (IMN) 
Nz 
(G) 
AOA 
(deg) 
Dive 
Angle 
(deg) 
Minimum Miss 
Distance to Store 
(in) 
Results 
0.66 2.19 
0.74 1.82 
0.82 1.50 
0.90 1.33 
Safe Jettison No Adjacent 
Store 
0.95 
1.0 
1.13 
0 
JSOW / Pylon 
minimum miss 
distance of 1.59 in 
occurs at carriage 
Note (2) 
0.66 2.52 22.41 Tank 
0.70 2.33 21.81 Tank 
0.74 2.16 19.60 Tank 
0.78 1.99 16.76 Tank 
0.82 1.76 13.72 Tank 
0.86 1.58 11.27 Tank 
Safe Jettison 
0.90 1.42 8.95 Tank Note (3) 
0.95 
1.0 
1.12 
0 
0.00 Tank Notes (2) and (3) 
0.95 0.94 0.00 Tank Notes (2) and (3) 
Adjacent 
Inboard 
Station Fuel 
Tank 
0.80 0.71 1.60 -45 9.79 Tank Safe Jettison 
Notes: (1) Table and wind tunnel analysis produced by MDA and provided to Government for JSOW Test Plan. 
 (2) Violates MIL-STD-1763A requirement “No portion of the separating store may penetrate a 6 inch 
 boundary surrounding the aircraft, suspension equipment or adjacent stores.” 
 (3) Violates MIL-STD-1763A requirement “Portions of the separating store inside of the 6 inch boundary 
 upon release are prohibited from further encroachment.” 
 
Source: Adapted from M. J. Holmes III, K. A. Gordon, MDA F/A-18 JSOW Launch / Jettison Wind Tunnel and Analysis Report, 
MDC93B0191 of 15 December 1993, as incorporated into NAWCAD FTEG Project Test Plan 1571 of 10 February 1994. 
 
Table E-2 
JSOW Jettison Event-1, 6-DOF Post-Flight Data 
Parameter(1) 
Time 
(sec) 
x 
(ft) 
y 
(ft) 
z 
(ft) 
Psi 
(deg) 
Theta 
(deg) 
Phi 
(deg) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.40 0.00 
0.10 -0.07 -0.02 0.82 -0.38 -4.59 -0.05 
0.20 -0.21 -0.08 2.26 -1.25 -7.18 1.93 
0.30 -0.41 -0.19 4.10 -2.17 -10.01 3.24 
0.40 -0.69 -0.39 6.36 -2.80 -12.45 3.01 
0.50 -1.04 -0.68 9.10 -2.94 -14.20 .048 
0.60 -1.50 -1.06 12.33 -2.49 -15.16 -4.36 
0.70 -2.05 -1.52 16.05 -1.50 -15.30 -11.14 
0.80 -2.71 -2.05 20.27 -0.17 -14.67 -19.33 
0.90 -3.46 -2.60 24.94 1.23 -13.42 -28.24 
1.00 -4.29 -3.15 30.05 2.44 -11.77 -37.09 
Notes: (1) Psi, Theta, and Phi represent Yaw, Pitch and Roll angles, respectively.  Sign convention is: 
 +x is forward, +y is lateral right, +z is down; +Psi is nose right, +Theta is nose up, +Phi is right roll.  
 
Source: Texas Instruments, JSOW F/A-18 Aircraft Jettison #2 & #3 TRR Meeting Minutes, 31 March 1994. 
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Table E-3 
JSOW Jettison Event-3, 6-DOF Post-Flight Data 
Parameter(1) 
Time 
(sec) 
x 
(ft) 
y 
(ft) 
z 
(ft) 
Psi 
(deg) 
Theta 
(deg) 
Phi 
(deg) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.00 0.00 
0.10 -0.10 -0.03 0.89 -1.11 -5.25 0.72 
0.20 -0.34 -0.15 2.51 -3.28 -9.84 2.01 
0.30 -0.73 -0.45 4.64 -4.60 -14.12 -0.59 
0.40 -1.31 -1.00 7.43 -3.83 -16.46 -9.86 
0.50 -2.11 -1.76 10.91 -1.07 -15.92 -25.02 
0.60 -3.10 -2.62 15.06 2.38 -13.09 -43.11 
0.70 -4.25 -3.43 19.73 5.52 -9.11 -61.88 
0.80 -5.52 -4.09 24.79 7.77 -5.01 -80.11 
0.90 -6.92 -4.51 30.08 8.70 -1.73 -97.17 
1.00 -8.45 -4.68 35.46 8.35 -0.16 -112.60 
Notes: (1) Psi, Theta, and Phi represent Yaw, Pitch and Roll angles, respectively.  Sign convention is: 
 +x is forward, +y is lateral right, +z is down; +Psi is nose right, +Theta is nose up, +Phi is right roll. 
 
Source: Texas Instruments, JSOW F/A-18 Aircraft Jettison #4, #5 & #6 TRR Meeting Minutes, 22 April 1994. 
 
 
 
 
Table E-4 
JSOW Jettison Event-6, 6-DOF Post-Flight Data 
Parameter(1) 
Time 
(sec) 
x 
(ft) 
y 
(ft) 
z 
(ft) 
Psi 
(deg) 
Theta 
(deg) 
Phi 
(deg) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.00 0.00 
0.10 0.01 0.04 0.79 -1.10 -4.71 0.18 
0.20 -0.11 0.08 2.20 -4.12 -8.00 2.07 
0.30 -0.26 0.01 4.02 -8.09 -11.78 4.01 
0.40 -0.39 -0.34 6.36 -11.50 -14.27 2.07 
0.50 -0.50 -1.11 9.34 -14.17 -13.40 -10.16 
0.60 -0.60 -2.25 12.83 -16.04 -10.00 -26.22 
0.70 -0.67 -3.62 16.57 -14.95 -5.96 -35.00 
0.80 -0.72 -5.06 20.42 -10.48 -1.43 -29.47 
0.90 -0.80 -6.46 24.38 -3.58 2.61 -13.38 
1.00 -0.95 -7.75 28.48 3.03 4.55 2.88 
Notes: (1) Psi, Theta, and Phi represent Yaw, Pitch and Roll angles, respectively.  Sign convention is: 
 +x is forward, +y is lateral right, +z is down; +Psi is nose right, +Theta is nose up, +Phi is right roll. 
 
Source: Mr. Chris McLean, Texas Instruments, JSOW F/A-18 Aircraft Jettison #7 & #8 Test Readiness Data, 31 May 1994. 
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Table E-5 
JSOW Jettison Event-8, 6-DOF Post-Flight Data 
Parameter(1) 
Time 
(sec) 
x 
(ft) 
y 
(ft) 
z 
(ft) 
Psi 
(deg) 
Theta 
(deg) 
Phi 
(deg) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.00 0.00 
0.10 0.03 0.02 0.68 -1.42 -4.35 -1.00 
0.20 0.00 0.04 1.95 -6.07 -8.51 0.02 
0.30 -0.05 -0.16 3.75 -12.20 -13.42 0.03 
0.40 -0.12 -0.92 6.33 -18.91 -15.08 -12.78 
0.50 -0.19 -2.40 9.53 -23.61 -13.00 -37.07 
0.60 -0.21 -4.53 12.63 -25.04 -10.72 -46.85 
0.70 -0.20 -7.26 15.47 -21.76 -7.05 -36.54 
0.80 -0.21 -10.36 18.38 -14.66 -2.92 -8.02 
0.90 -0.29 -13.67 21.69 -6.21 1.45 30.88 
1.00 -0.45 -17.22 25.40 2.44 5.46 77.57 
Notes: (1) Psi, Theta, and Phi represent Yaw, Pitch and Roll angles, respectively.  Sign convention is: 
 +x is forward, +y is lateral right, +z is down; +Psi is nose right, +Theta is nose up, +Phi is right roll. 
 
Source: Mr. Chris McLean, Texas Instruments, JSOW F/A-18 Aircraft Jettison #9 & #10 Test Readiness Data, 10 June 1994. 
 
 
 
 
Table E-6 
JSOW Jettison Event-11, 6-DOF Post-Flight Data 
Parameter(1) 
Time 
(sec) 
x 
(ft) 
y 
(ft) 
z 
(ft) 
Psi 
(deg) 
Theta 
(deg) 
Phi 
(deg) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.00 0.00 
0.10 -0.05 0.05 0.72 -2.03 -5.20 -0.41 
0.20 -0.38 -0.02 2.10 -10.50 -12.10 0.02 
0.30 -0.81 -1.03 4.60 -25.30 -17.15 -7.91 
0.40 -1.12 -4.68 7.80 -41.64 -26.68 -35.88 
0.50 -1.10 -12.73 9.85 -65.40 -40.61 -29.26 
0.60 -0.56 -25.68 11.16 -95.54 -45.19 9.04 
0.70 0.47 -42.72 12.00 -92.63 -44.58 -15.21 
0.80 1.90 -63.45 12.31 -58.06 -41.14 -50.22 
Notes: (1) Psi, Theta, and Phi represent Yaw, Pitch and Roll angles, respectively.  Sign convention is: 
 +x is forward, +y is lateral right, +z is down; +Psi is nose right, +Theta is nose up, +Phi is right roll.  
 
Source: Mr. Chris McLean, Texas Instruments, JSOW F/A-18 Aircraft Jettison #12 Test Readiness Data, 8 August 1994. 
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Table E-7 
JSOW Jettison Event-12, 6-DOF Post-Flight Data 
Parameter(1) 
Time 
(sec) 
x 
(ft) 
y 
(ft) 
z 
(ft) 
Psi 
(deg) 
Theta 
(deg) 
Phi 
(deg) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.00 0.00 
0.10 -0.04 0.02 0.74 -2.60 -5.84 -1.49 
0.20 -0.35 -0.12 2.37 -14.00 -12.33 -4.46 
0.30 -0.85 -1.63 5.21 -30.26 -17.07 -20.46 
0.40 -1.42 -6.42 7.63 -43.16 -29.19 -40.03 
0.50 -1.80 -16.06 8.83 -72.41 -39.14 -6.97 
0.60 -1.98 -30.78 9.55 -98.32 -43.75 9.11 
0.70 -1.89 -49.69 9.81 -84.97 -48.72 -32.39 
0.80 -1.59 -72.37 9.04 -41.66 -42.76 -62.82 
Notes: (1) Psi, Theta, and Phi represent Yaw, Pitch and Roll angles, respectively.  Sign convention is: 
 +x is forward, +y is lateral right, +z is down; +Psi is nose right, +Theta is nose up, +Phi is right roll.  
 
Source: Mr. Chris McLean, Texas Instruments, JSOW F/A-18 Aircraft Jettison #13 Test Readiness Review, 30 August 1994. 
 
Table E-8 
JSOW Jettison Event-13, 6-DOF Post-Flight Data 
Parameter(1) 
Time 
(sec) 
x 
(ft) 
y 
(ft) 
z 
(ft) 
Psi 
(deg) 
Theta 
(deg) 
Phi 
(deg) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.00 0.00 
0.10 -0.06 0.06 0.74 -3.01 -6.00 -1.16 
0.20 -0.47 -0.14 2.44 -16.23 -12.08 -5.90 
0.30 -1.25 -2.34 5.28 -34.10 -13.28 -22.86 
0.40 -2.23 -8.40 7.03 -43.51 -23.28 -27.69 
0.50 -3.22 -19.64 7.94 -64.66 -44.72 -0.52 
0.60 -4.21 -36.46 9.67 -103.30 -58.90 31.64 
0.70 -5.17 -57.98 11.72 -87.05 -65.37 -13.92 
Notes: (1) Psi, Theta, and Phi represent Yaw, Pitch and Roll angles, respectively.  Sign convention is: 
 +x is forward, +y is lateral right, +z is down; +Psi is nose right, +Theta is nose up, +Phi is right roll.  
 
Source: Mr. Dave Duggan, Texas Instruments, JSOW F/A-18 Aircraft Jettison #14 Test Readiness Review, 7 October 1994. 
 
Table E-9 
JSOW Jettison Event-17, 6-DOF Post-Flight Data 
Parameter(1) 
Time 
(sec) 
x 
(ft) 
y 
(ft) 
z 
(ft) 
Psi 
(deg) 
Theta 
(deg) 
Phi 
(deg) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.00 0.00 
0.10 -0.02 0.05 0.84 -0.34 -5.04 -0.25 
0.20 -0.24 0.08 2.40 -1.76 -11.59 -0.23 
0.30 -0.54 -0.15 4.77 -1.23 -18.88 -6.06 
0.40 -0.88 -0.73 8.22 4.52 -21.71 -14.35 
0.50 -1.22 -1.27 12.80 10.93 -18.74 -21.26 
0.60 -1.57 -1.31 18.35 10.35 -13.24 -26.89 
0.70 -1.94 -0.97 24.59 6.13 -6.56 -26.30 
0.80 -2.36 -0.40 31.23 1.34 0.38 -26.95 
Notes: (1) Psi, Theta, and Phi represent Yaw, Pitch and Roll angles, respectively.  Sign convention is: 
 +x is forward, +y is lateral right, +z is down; +Psi is nose right, +Theta is nose up, +Phi is right roll. 
 
Source: Mr. Chris McLean, Texas Instruments, JSOW F/A-18 Aircraft Jettison #18 or #19 Test Readiness Data, 31 October 1994.
  
Figure E-1 
MDA Wind Tunnel Analysis and Prediction, JSOW Jettison 1 
 
Source:  Adapted from M. J. Holmes III, K. A. Gordon, MDA F/A-18 JSOW Launch / Jettison Wind Tunnel and Analysis Report, MDC93B0191 of 15 December 1993, as incorporated into  
NAWCAD FTEG Project Test Plan 1571 of 10 February 1994. 
69 
  
Figure E-2 
MDA Wind Tunnel Analysis and Prediction, JSOW Jettison 5 
 
Source:  Adapted from M. J. Holmes III, K. A. Gordon, MDA F/A-18 JSOW Launch / Jettison Wind Tunnel and Analysis Report, MDC93B0191 of 15 December 1993, as incorporated into  
NAWCAD FTEG Project Test Plan 1571 of 10 February 1994. 
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Figure E-3 
MDA Wind Tunnel Analysis and Prediction, JSOW Jettison 6 
 
Source: Adapted from M. J. Holmes III, K. A. Gordon, MDA F/A-18 JSOW Launch / Jettison Wind Tunnel and Analysis Report, MDC93B0191 of 15 December 1993, as incorporated into  
NAWCAD FTEG Project Test Plan 1571 of 10 February 1994. 
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Figure E-4 
MDA Wind Tunnel Analysis and Prediction, JSOW Jettison 13 
 
Source: Adapted from M. J. Holmes III, K. A. Gordon, MDA F/A-18 JSOW Launch / Jettison Wind Tunnel and Analysis Report, MDC93B0191 of 15 December 1993, as incorporated into  
NAWCAD FTEG Project Test Plan 1571 of 10 February 1994. 
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Figure E-5 
MDA Wind Tunnel Analysis and Prediction, JSOW Jettison 14 
 
Source: Adapted from M. J. Holmes III, K. A. Gordon, MDA F/A-18 JSOW Launch / Jettison Wind Tunnel and Analysis Report, MDC93B0191 of 15 December 1993, as incorporated into  
NAWCAD FTEG Project Test Plan 1571 of 10 February 1994. 
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Figure E-6 
MDA Wind Tunnel Analysis and Prediction, JSOW Jettison 17 
 
Source: Adapted from M. J. Holmes III, K. A. Gordon, MDA as incorporated into NAWCAD FTEG Project Test Plan 1571 of 10 February 1994, Amendment 4 of 4 October 1994. 
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Figure E-7 
MDA Wind Tunnel Analysis and Prediction, JSOW Jettison 20 
 
Source: Adapted from M. J. Holmes III, K. A. Gordon, MDA F/A-18 JSOW Launch / Jettison Wind Tunnel and Analysis Report, MDC93B0191 of 15 December 1993, as incorporated into  
Texas Instruments JSOW F/A-18 Aircraft Jettison #18 or #19 Test Readiness Data, 31 October 1994. 
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Figure E-8 
MDA Revised Analysis and Prediction, JSOW Jettison 20 
 
Source: Mr. Pierre Pondrom, MDA, as incorporated into Texas Instruments JSOW F/A-18 Aircraft Jettison #18 or #19 Test Readiness Data, 31 October 1994. 
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Figure E-9 
TI Post-Flight Analysis of JSOW Jettison 12 
77 
Source: Mr. Chris McLean, Texas Instruments, JSOW F/A-18 Aircraft Jettison #13 Test Readiness Review, 30 August 1994. 
 
  
Figure E-10 
TI Pre-Flight Prediction of JSOW Jettison 13 
78 
Source: Mr. Chris McLean, Texas Instruments, JSOW F/A-18 Aircraft Jettison #13 Test Readiness Review, 30 August 1994. 
 
  
Figure E-11 
TI Post-Flight Analysis of JSOW Jettison 13 
79 
Source: Mr. Dave Duggan, Texas Instruments, JSOW F/A-18 Aircraft Jettison #14 Test Readiness Review, 7 October 1994. 
 
  
Figure E-12 
TI Post-Flight Analysis of JSOW Jettison 17 
 
Source: Mr. Chris McLean, Texas Instruments, JSOW F/A-18 Aircraft Jettison #18 or #19 Test Readiness Data, 31 October 1994. 
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Figure E-13 
TI Pre-Flight Prediction of JSOW Jettison 20 
81 
Source: Mr. Chris McLean, Texas Instruments, JSOW F/A-18 Aircraft Jettison #18 or #19 Test Readiness Data, 31 October 1994. 
 
  
Figure E-14 
MDA Combined Analysis and Prediction, JSOW Jettison 13 
 
Source: Mr. M. J. Holmes III, MDA, as incorporated into Texas Instruments, JSOW F/A-18 Aircraft Jettison #13 Test Readiness Review, 30 August 1994. 
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Figure E-15 
MDA Combined Post-Flight Analysis, JSOW Jettison 13 
83 
Source: Mr. Pierre Pondrom, MDA, as incorporated into Texas Instruments, JSOW F/A-18 Aircraft Jettison #14 Test Readiness Review, 7 October 1994. 
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VITA 
 
Born the son of an Army officer in San Antonio, TX, Commander Hinson is a native of Charleston, SC.  
He graduated from the University of South Carolina with a major in Chemistry and a member of Phi Beta 
Kappa, and was commissioned an Ensign in the United States Navy in May of 1985. 
 
Flight training took him to Pensacola, FL, then on to Beeville, TX, for intermediate and advanced jet 
training in VT-26 and VT-25.  Commander Hinson earned his Wings of Gold in January, 1987.  As a 
Selectively Retained Graduate (SERGRAD) flight instructor, his first assignment was to train prospective 
Naval Flight Officers at VT-10 in Pensacola.  In February, 1989, he was again ordered to flight training, 
this time as an F/A-18 Hornet Fleet Replacement Pilot at VFA-106 in Cecil Field, FL. 
 
Commander Hinson’s first fleet squadron was the VFA-15 “Valions”, where he served as the Avionics and 
Armament Division Officer, Nuclear Weapons Training Officer, Personnel Officer, Administrative Officer 
and Command Security Manager from November, 1989 to June, 1992.  In 1991, he deployed aboard USS 
Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) and flew combat missions in support of Operations Desert Shield, Desert 
Storm and Provide Comfort.  He left the Valions in June of 1992 and reported as a member of the United 
States Naval Test Pilot School (USNTPS) 103rd class. 
 
A distinguished graduate from USNTPS, Commander Hinson was assigned to the Strike Aircraft Test 
Directorate of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, MD, from June, 1993 to 
June, 1995.  As a test pilot for the Ordnance Department, he was the Project Officer for the Joint Standoff 
Weapon (JSOW), the Automated Tactical Manual Supplement (ATACS) and many other smaller 
programs.  He also flew test flights in support of High Lateral Asymmetry Flying Qualities envelope 
expansion, Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) Engineering and Manufacturing Development, and 
Automated Carrier Landing Systems certification on three aircraft carriers.  He successfully launched the 
first free-flight JSOW at China Lake, CA, in December 1994, which marked the new era of GPS/INS-only 
guided munitions.  Later in December of 1994, he was awarded the Captain “Axel” Hazelrigg Award for 
superior leadership. 
 
Commander Hinson reported directly to the VFA-131 “Wildcats” in June of 1995 for duties as the 
Administrative Officer and Command Security Manager, Safety Officer and Operations Officer.  While 
deployed aboard USS George Washington (CVN 73) for the first half of 1996, he flew missions in support 
of Operations Decisive Endeavor and Southern Watch.  Following work-ups on USS John C. Stennis (CVN 
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74), he completed his department head tour in late November 1997, and reported to the Staff of USNTPS, 
again in Patuxent River, MD. 
 
Commander Hinson held the positions of Senior Airborne Systems Curriculum Instructor and Operations 
Officer while at USNTPS, and was selected as the 1998 Instructor of the Year.  Late in July of 2000, he 
reported to the Balkans Combined Air Operations Center, Vicenza, Italy, where he served as the C-5 Plans 
Cell Chief in charge of force beddown and allocation, theater aircrew special instructions (SPINS) and 
theater exercise coordination.  This tour included travel to theater locations including Pristina, Kosovo; 
Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina; and Zagreb, Croatia. 
 
Returning to the United States on the first of March, 2001, Commander Hinson moved to Virginia Beach, 
VA, reported to VFA-106 briefly for carrier qualification, and then reported to the CVW-7 Staff as the 
Operations Officer.  Highlights of this tour include support for Operation Noble Eagle for homeland 
defense following the attack of September 11, 2001; combat operations in support of Operation Enduring 
Freedom while deployed in 2002 aboard USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67); and acting as the Officer-in-
Charge of a three-F/A-18 fighter detachment to Azraq, Jordan – also while deployed to the North Arabian 
Sea.  Following three months of training, he then reported to the “Outlaws” of Strike Fighter Weapons 
School, Pacific in October, 2002, for duty as the Executive Officer.  He took command of the Strike Fighter 
Weapons School, Pacific in January 2004, and held the position until the sixth of May, 2005.  CDR Hinson 
currently serves as the F/A-18 and EA-18G Program Manager Communication, Navigation, Identification 
and Landing Systems Deputy Integrated Program Team Lead within the Naval Air Systems Command, 
Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland. 
 
Qualified in all series of the F/A-18 and the T-34C, Commander Hinson has accumulated 4285 total flight 
hours in 65 different airplanes and helicopters, including over 2700 hours in the F/A-18 and over 500 
carrier arrested landings.  He also holds the civilian certification of Air Transport Pilot (ATP), and is an 
active member of the Navy’s Acquisition Professional Community and the Society of Experimental Test 
Pilots.  Personal decorations include the Meritorious Service Medal (three awards), Strike Flight Air Medal 
(four awards), Joint Service Commendation Medal, Navy Commendation Medal (five awards, two with 
combat distinguishing device), Navy Achievement Medal and numerous theater and campaign medals. 
